EXPLORING MILITARY NONCOMBAT OPERATIONS

A Dissertation

by

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ABSTRACT

This research explored the relationship between the factors of public support for military noncombat operations and for combat operations. Three experiments each assessed how the specifics of a situation, individual belief sets, and their combination influenced public support for the policy options. The research found the factors influential on public support for noncombat and combat were essentially the same, but a preference for noncombat existed after taking personal belief sets into account. Additionally, characteristics of the situation mattered. Instrumental situation and personal belief set elements were the most influential, but situation elements considered normatively infinitely valuable, such as human lives, retained direct influence on public support even after accounting for personal value sets.

DEDICATION

I embarked on the journey toward this dissertation for my family. The support and encouragement Noah, Christian, Nathan, and especially Stephanie provided made its completion possible.

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Disclaimer

The views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

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NOMENCLATURE

ACME	Average Causal Mediation Effect
ANOVA	Analysis of Variance
MTurk	Amazon's Mechanical Turk
ODA	Official Development Aid
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PPO	Principal Policy Objective
SVPM	Sacred Value Protection Model

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE Page

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE Page

1. FUNDAMENTALS

1.1 Military Noncombat Operations

The United States military serves to ensure the country's security and serves as an implement of its foreign policy. The capabilities the military provides span the full range of military operations and address the full spectrum of conflict according to Department of Defense Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (2011). As a result, when confronting a crisis American leaders have the capability to address it using combat or noncombat operations[1]. Noncombat operations are a large and broad category of under-studied military endeavors. They are distinct from combat operations. The core capability necessary for combat operations is violent war fighting, while the core capability of noncombat operations is the delivery of capacity enhancement absent the need for violence.

Most people have some concept of the nature of combat operations, but noncombat operations require more explanation. Such operations fall into two broad categories: humanitarian operations and national security-related capacity building operations. Humanitarian operations generally refer to actions taken to respond to or prevent the consequences of disasters and actions to provide other civic aid.[2] Examples of humanitarian operations include the United States' responses to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, and the 2011 tsunami in Japan, Oper-

[1]The Department of Defense lexicon is constantly changing. As a result, "noncombat operations" is included in of Defense Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (2017), but it has no specific definition. It is possible to infer a separation between combat and noncombat operations using information from Department of Defense Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (2011) and the Department of Defense Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (2017). The first indicates distinctions between combat operations and other types including humanitarian operations, peace operations, defense support to civil authorities, foreign internal defense (a training mission), stability activities, security cooperation, and several others. The second references noncombat in describing situations not related to direct combat engagement with an adversary. Given this context, it is appropriate to use noncombat operations as a general term to encompass the range of military missions other than those intended to apply violence directly to an adversary.

[2]These efforts differ from combat operations conducted to respond to human atrocities, such as genocide. In those cases, the core capability the military provides is violent war fighting, despite the justification for its execution being humanitarian. The 2011 actions of the coalition against Libya, Operation ODYSSEY DAWN, provide an example of such a situation.

ation TOMODACHI. National security-related capacity building, the other category of noncombat operations, improves the capabilities of foreign countries of security interest to the United States. Generally, the capacity building efforts relate to training and exercises, institutional process improvement, or the procurement of higher capability equipment. One example of these efforts in response to an international crisis was the increase in military aid to Israel during and following the October 1973 War. In fiscal year 1974, which included October of 1973, the United States provided Israel with $983 million in military loans and $1.5 billion in military grants according to Sharp (2010). As Gutfeld and Zumbrunnen (2013) documented, much of the aid came during Operation NICKEL GRASS, the effort to airlift arms and equipment from the United States to Israel during the war.

The scope and breadth of noncombat operations is significant. A recent accounting of Department of Defense efforts toward building partner capacity resulted in identifying 173 separate programs (Government Accountability Office (2017)). Serafino (2014) found the budget for one type of aid, Security Assistance Reform, was $314 million slated to 29 countries. Finally, the Department of Defense spent $104 million in 2012 on humanitarian relief and civic aid according to the latest available information (Department of Defense (2013)). Despite the expense of combat efforts dwarfing those of noncombat operations, these numbers indicate noncombat operations are important and warrant efforts to understand them.[3]

The United States spends personnel, wealth, and other resources on the conduct of military noncombat operations. The United States, however, does not respond to every humanitarian crisis nor does it provide training, equipment, or funding to every potential suitor[4]. It is possible public support for such operations influences decision makers. If so, it is worth understanding what

[3]Combat is expensive in terms of human costs and financial ones. Different scholars use different methods to calculate costs, but Daggett (2010) identified $1.1 trillion in specific post-9/11 operations appropriations through 2010 and Crawford (2016) calculated the 2016 costs of post-9/11 operations at $4.6 trillion when including the long-term requirement to support war veterans. Many scholars consider the costs of violent conflict so high only the irrational or ill-informed would participate (Fearon (1995)).

[4]The United States is also selective in its involvement in conflict.

factors drive public support for noncombat operations and if the factors of support for noncombat operations differ from those of combat operations.

1.2 Literature Review

Literature on the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy provided the background for this research. Scholars have studied both the general relationship between public opinion and foreign policy and the specific relationships between public opinion and foreign aid or conflict. Conceptually, noncombat operations exist in an unexamined space between them. At its essence, the primary outcome of foreign aid is helping another while the primary outcome of conflict is compelling another. The capabilities to provide assistance to foreign military and civilian development exist within the U.S. military. Abilities as diffuse as building hospitals, training law enforcement, and training foreign military forces are within the portfolio available for a noncombat response to a crisis. The existing gap in knowledge relates to the public support of the use of the military to provide assistance, as it does during noncombat operations, rather than as an instrument of violence.

1.2.1 Public Support and Foreign Policy

Research relating American public support and foreign policy decisions has undergone several evolutions. Theory from the 1950s and 1960s coalesced into what Holsti and Rosenau (1979) referred to as the Almond-Lippmann Consensus. Three expectations defined the consensus. First, the opinions of the public on foreign affairs were irrelevant to decision makers (Almond (1950)). Second, the public's opinions were volatile and subject to manipulation (Lippmann (1955)). Finally, the public's opinions were so incoherent as to defy characterization into a generalizable position (Converse (1964)). Together these expectations disconnected foreign policy from the masses for many scholars.

Later scholars questioned these expectations and found their universality did not necessarily hold. In the second generation of research, scholars found deeper understanding of foreign affairs in the public than the expectations indicated. Verba et al. (1967) found some level of rational cost-benefit processing occurred in the public's positions, while Mueller (1973) found evidence the public explored the value of alternative outcomes for foreign affairs events. The third generation of research found more specific evidence against the Almond-Lippmann expectations. Holsti (1992) found the public's positions to be coherent and Jentleson (1992) found the positions rationally reflected a cost-benefit framework.

Some researchers expected the public was ill-informed until elites provided it the information necessary to form opinions on foreign affairs. Under this model, political elites led the public to its positions on foreign affairs (Brody and Shapiro (1989); Brody (1991); Zaller (1992); Lippmann (2017)). Examples countering the theory of elite-driven opinion exist. During the period before the Iraq War elites and the media were consistent in their support for action, but a sizable portion of the U.S. population was against the war (Hayes and Guardino (2010, 2011)). In another case, Enns (2014) found political leaders did not shape public opinion, but followed their constituents on incarceration policy. Situations wherein the public holds positions different from elites are a challenge to the elite-driven construct.

Recent studies found evidence of a more independent public opinion formation process than the elite-driven model would expect. Kertzer and Zeitzoff (2017) found a bottom-up process of opinion formation occurred on foreign policy issues[5]. The mechanism they identified was the social nature of opinion formation. They, along with Druckman and Nelson (2003) and Klar (2014), found the social environment of individuals, conversations among peers, influenced policy preference more than partisan cues.

[5]Several other studies found a bottom-up process for domestic concerns (Saeki (2013); Enns (2014)).

Mass media is another possible source for the public's opinion of foreign policy. Some studies, including Lippmann (2017), Bennett, Lawrence and Livingston (2006), and Brody (1991) indicated the media act as conduit for the opinions of political leaders. Other research by Baum and Potter (2008*a*) found the media to be strategic actors with some independence from political elites when shaping public opinion. Recent research, however, demonstrated the relationship is more complicated than a unidirectional media-to-public model would suppose. In some research, social media provided the mechanism for generating independence from media elites. Lee et al. (2014) found social media users to have access to a broad range of ideas and opinions on political topics. In opposition to expectations social media users would select politically confirmatory sources and groups, users more involved in political and news-related topic discussions had more politically diverse social networks. Among those involved in discussions, those most active tended to be more highly polarized than those less active, but the less polarized still had equivalently diverse networks. These findings on the diversity of information available to the public were important because Baum and Groeling (2010) found the public formed its own opinions as information asymmetry between it and elites decreased[6].

Public support for foreign affairs matters to political leaders. Fiorina (1981) and Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde (1990) found the public used foreign affairs performance in determining its support of political leaders. For example, following Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, the effort to provide assistance to countries harmed by the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, Gallup and Newport (2006) showed President Bush had a 75% approval rating on his handling of the situation while his overall job approval rating was 52%. The tsunami relief was the area in which the president scored the highest approval and the overall approval level was 3% higher than the poll taken just before the event three weeks earlier. The accumulated research indicates the public is not only aware of foreign affairs, but also has some sophistication in its knowledge and uses its expectations

[6]This experiment research provided the information to participants directly without reference to a source. As a result, the question of the independence of public opinion from political or media elite influence is not a concern. Such a question would be fertile ground for future research into the public support of combat and noncombat military operations.

about foreign affairs to assess politicians.

1.2.1.1 Public Support for Foreign Aid

Generally, foreign aid efforts fall into one of two categories: humanitarian assistance and official development aid (ODA). According to the United Nations Office of Humanitarian Coordination, the definition of humanitarian assistance is as follows:

> Aid that seeks, to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis affected population. Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the basic humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality, as stated in General Assembly Resolution 46/182. In addition, the UN seeks to provide humanitarian assistance with full respect for the sovereignty of States. Assistance may be divided into three categories - direct assistance, indirect assistance and infrastructure support - which have diminishing degrees of contact with the affected population. (World Health Organization and others (2008))

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) similarly defines humanitarian aid as "action (that) saves lives, alleviates suffering and maintains human dignity following conflict, shocks and natural disasters." (*Humanitarian Assistance* (N.d.))

Hynes and Scott (OECD Publishing, 2013) stated the definition of ODA has changed over time. From its beginnings in 1963, however, ODA has maintained three essential characteristics: a primary motivation to develop the recipient, a character of official assistance from a donor government, and some level of concession from the donor. In both humanitarian and ODA cases, the intent of the assistance is to improve the situation regardless of whether it is acute or chronic.

Research on the influence of public support on foreign aid indicated foreign aid suffers from a challenge. Smillie (1999) described public support for foreign aid as being "a mile wide and

an inch deep." Public support is often wide spread, but commitment to foreign aid is low. This challenge is important because evidence exists relating public support levels to consequences for foreign aid procurement. Smillie (2003) argued soft support for foreign aid can result in reductions of aid without significant political repercussions. Collier (2008) also argued different levels of public support can influence both the type and amount of aid donor states provide. Given these facts, it is important to understand what factors influence public opinion on foreign aid.

Three trends driving public support emerged from the literature. The first was moral. The ability to empathize and sympathize influenced support. Scholars have found recognition of genuine need, a spirit of generosity, and a commitment to altruism each to increase public support for foreign aid (Mosley (1985); Otter (2003); Fink and Redaelli (2011); Paxton and Knack (2012)). The second trend related to an individual's perception of the characteristics of the players involved in the situation. Chong and Gradstein (2008) and Paxton and Knack (2012) found attitudes toward recipients (the other), a perception of the inefficiency of one's own government (the primary actor), and political spectrum position (self) each influenced public support for foreign aid. Specifically, negative impressions of the recipient of aid reduced support for providing aid as did a perception the donor's government is inefficient and political conservatism. The third trend included practical justifications for supporting foreign aid. They included the strategic importance of the recipient country, the potential for the recipient country to become an economic partner, and the ability to absorb the financial costs of aid as a function of the donor country's income level or wealth (Otter (2003); Fink and Redaelli (2011); Paxton and Knack (2012); Milner and Tingley (2013)). These broad trends provided insight on how the public determined its support for assisting another through foreign aid.

1.2.1.2 Public Support for Involvement in Military Conflict

Just as with foreign aid, public support is relevant to decisions on American participation in military conflict operations. Audience cost arguments indicate public opinion generally influences

political leaders, those responsible for such decisions in a democracy (Fearon (1994, 1997); Tomz (2007); Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999)). Knecht and Weatherford (2006) found the public's attention to an issue influenced specific processes decision makers use in coming to a conclusion. More specific scholarship found the influence of public opinion on the conflict decisions of democratic leaders (Fearon (1994); Baum (2004); Baum and Potter (2008*b*)). Beyond the initial decision to employ the military, public support is critical to sustaining the effort (Summers (1995)). Finally, studies have shown the level of support for military missions influences presidential and congressional approval ratings (Haar (2015); Hildebrandt et al. (2013)).

Evidence exists that public support for military combat operations follows the same trends as for foreign aid. The moral trend manifested in the research of several scholars. Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) found the justification for a military operation influenced support. When the public determined the actions to be just, support increased. Relatedly, several scholars found the "principal policy objective (PPO)" of a mission to be one of the vital factors for determining public support for combat operations. Public support was significantly lower when the PPO was to initiate an internal change of the foreign nation's regime, an act seen as aggressive, than it was for objectives related to doing what is right, such as for humanitarian interventions, or when necessary to restrain a belligerent's aggressive foreign policy (Jentleson (1992); Jentleson and Britton (1998); Oneal, Lian and Joyner (1996); Eichenberg (2005); Nincic (1997)).

Characteristics of the players involved factored into the public support for military combat operations as well. Similarly to other political questions, an individual's partisan identification on a spectrum between Democrat and Republican indicated preferences for the use of force in research by Kane and Norpoth (2017); and Hetherington and Suhay (2011). Russett and Nincic (1976) addressed how the identity of the country in need, the other, influenced support for military actions in that country's defense.

Finally, a practical trend exists in the determination of public support for combat operations. Several studies indicated human and financial costs influence support for military operations, although the precise balance between the types of costs is unknown (Gartner and Segura (1998); Eichenberg (2005); Flores-Macías and Kreps (2015); Miller and Barber IV (2016); Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009)). Expectations about the level of success an operation will have also influenced support (Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2006, 2009); Eichenberg (2005); Gartner (2008)). These practical factors indicate the rational cost-benefit calculation Jentleson (1992) would have expected as well as the rational expectations about success Gartner and Gelpi (2016) discussed.

1.3 Framework

Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) provided the initial conceptual framework for this research. In their original construction, the interaction of the expectation of success and moral rightness of action influenced casualty tolerance[7]. The extension in Figure 1.1 shows their later development using public support as the element of the model being explained and the contingent influence of casualty tolerance resulting from inclusion of success expectations in the model.



Figure 1.1: Extended Version of the Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) Framework

[7]They also included demographics, education level, and political party in their original model.

The Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) framework included factors related to cost-benefit processing, but also included values-based elements. Consistently in their research, Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) found both cost-benefit and value factors mattered to the determination of support for conflict or for leaders. In their words:

> Our central argument is that—within the cost-benefit framework—when it comes to supporting an ongoing military mission in the face of a mounting human toll, expectations of success matter the most. Many factors—the stakes, the costs (both human and financial), the trustworthiness of the administration, the quality of the public consensus on the foreign policy goal in question, and so on—affect the robustness of support. But the public's expectation of whether the mission will be successful trumps other considerations. When it comes to voting on a president who has led the country into a costly war, the relative weights of factors shift; expectations of success still matter, but the most important factor appears to be whether the public views the initial decision to start the war as correct.

1.3.1 Generalized Framework

The Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) model was potentially one example of a more generalized model incorporating elements of a situation and factors intrinsic to an individual to determine a policy preference. The specifics of the situation under consideration, casualties and associated tolerance in the Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) case, can have direct influence on preferences, but other factors intrinsic to the individual can also have influence. Individuals bring a personally held belief set of norms, ideological worldview, and acceptable cost-benefit trade-offs to bear on the policy preference process. In the Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) model, both the expectation of success and the assessment of the moral rightness of acting were elements of the personal belief set. While both the situation and a personal belief set can have direct influence, their combination can also generate contingent influence.

Operating within the general framework, are substructures the work of Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009), Tetlock (1986), and George (1979) described. The relationship between the direct influence of a personal belief set, the direct influence of the situation, and their contingent influence on policy preference can explain both the findings of Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) and the existence of the trends found in the literature on public support for conflict and for foreign aid.

Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) based their work on tolerance for casualties, but others have based research squarely on values. Tetlock (1986) explored how value pluralism influenced decision making. He argued a hierarchy of values existed in individuals and the relative importance of values in conflict led to different policy preferences; the more important value tended to predict the preferred policy. Leveraging one of Tetlock's examples, an individual may value both individual freedom and social equality. For conservatives, he argued, individual freedom was a more important value thus the conservative would prefer lower taxes to income redistribution. One important implication of his research was recognizing people bring more than rationalist calculation to the process of forming preferences. A personal belief set related to worldview, norms, and the situation shape the rational cost-benefit calculation.

Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) used two aspects of a personal belief set in their research, the expectation of success and the moral rightness of taking action. One way to conceptualize a personal belief set is through operational code beliefs. Using such an operationalization can allow the unpacking of the personal belief set influencing public support. George (1979) argued operational code beliefs form a basis for cognitive processing of political information. Two types of operational code beliefs exist, instrumental and philosophical. Instrumental are about how politics operate, the "ends-means relationship in the context of political action." George (1969) argued instrumental operational code beliefs related the best approach for selecting goals for political action; how to pursue those goals most effectively; how the individual calculates, controls, and accepts risks for political actions; and what is the utility and role of different means in political action. In the Gelpi,

Feaver and Reifler (2009) framework, the expectation of success related to the utility of means and thus reflected an instrumental operational code belief.

Philosophical operational code beliefs are concerned with what an individual normatively values or believes is inherent in the nature of politics. George (1969) argued the philosophical operational code beliefs addressed "assumptions and premises he (a leader) makes regarding the fundamental nature of politics, the nature of political conflict, the role of the individual," etc. He argued questions related to an individual's perspective on the essential nature of political life, the prospects for realizing political values, and how much control or mastery over historical development individuals have formed the philosophical operational code beliefs. The moral rightness of acting in Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) related to the prospects for realizing political values (doing the right thing in this case), thus represented a philosophical operational code belief.

The framework of this paper began with Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009). They argued the cost-benefit model generally applied, but additional factors also influenced public support. An understanding of Tetlock (1986) allowed incorporation of a pluralistic values structure, a personal belief set, into the model as the additional factors. Operationalizing the values as philosophical and instrumental operational code beliefs unpacked the personal belief set and enabled exploration of the influence of the different belief types on the costs and benefits of a situation. Figure 1.2 provides the generalized conceptual model of public support for a policy including the relationship between the situation and the individual's personal belief set.



Figure 1.2: Conceptual Model of the Influence of the Situation and a Personal Belief Set on Public Support. Adapted from Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009).

This model allows improved assessment of public support by generalizing and expanding the Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) framework. The expansion allows exploration of several aspects for which the previous framework did not account. First, it enables exploration of the endogeneity between the situation and the personal belief set through the experiment process. The researcher can examine how beliefs influence the situation factor influence by presenting the situation first or the influence of the situation on beliefs by assessing beliefs first[8]. Second, it allows a researcher to ensure the situation and personal belief set each have unique influence on public support[9]. Third, it reveals what situation factors remain influential after accounting for beliefs.

The difference between philosophical and instrumental operational codes provided the key to understanding whether cost-benefit or value-based personal belief set factors will retain influence from the situation. According to the Sacred Value Protection Model (SVPM) of Tetlock (1986) more important values will define preferences. Applying the logic to the situation factors, the fac-

[8]This research followed the Situation->Personal Belief Set->Public Support path by presenting the situation to the participants first then conducting mediation analysis on the Situation factors.

[9]This research used the first two models of each experiment to establish unique influence

tors related to important values will retain influence despite the inclusion operational code belief variables.

Modeling to tease out the relationships required multiple steps. The first step was to model the situation to determine if the overall situation factors had influence. This model represented the direct influence of situation factors on public support. The second step was to identify variables related to the philosophical and instrumental operational code beliefs of a personal belief set and model their direct influence on public support. Finally, combining the models allowed assessment of the contingent influence of situation factors on public support.

1.4 Research Plan

This dissertation leveraged three survey experiments to explore the situation factors affecting support for different responses to an international crisis.[10, 11] The policy options under investigation were either a combat or noncombat response to an international crisis. Experimental control allowed the researcher to create the situation about which the participant answered questions. This process allowed the researcher to precisely introduce variation in the factors of interest. The method allowed specific determination of the existence of influence on the dependent variable by the factor under investigation. Each of the three experiments assessed a different aspect of the generation of support. The first experiment examined how costs and benefits influence the support for an action and how they influence the type of action, combat or noncombat operations, the participants prefer. The second experiment then assessed the influence of the moral justification for action and how the relationship between the recipient and the participants influenced support and the preference for a response type. Finally, the third experiment assessed several specific factors

[10]The dissertation does not address several the factors potentially related to support for using noncombat operations to pursue American interests. Among the concepts available for future research are: the relationship between information sources and support, the political environment, and the influence of international organizations such regional security organizations on support.

[11]The Texas A&M University Institutional Review Board approved the experiment including the treatments and survey questions under approval number IRB2017-0859D.

related to the public support of non-combat operations in particular.

Experiments require both internal and external validity. Internal validity concerns whether the results found can be causally attributed to the experiment factors. Cook, Campbell and Shadish (2002) and Morton and Williams (2010) discussed three elements of internal validity: construct validity, causal validity, and statistical validity. Construct validity relates to the link between theory and the inferences resulting from the experiment. The hypotheses in each experiment derive from established theories. Results consistent with the theories would provide evidence of construct validity. The between-subjects orthogonal experimental design provides a strong argument for attributing any differences in results to the experimentally manipulated factors. Statistical validity results from a combination of methods. First, the experiment included random assignment into treatments once a participant chose to take the survey. Assuming any uncontrolled biasing element is normally distributed in the participants, the random assignment of participants to treatments ensures the individual bias cannot influence the results. The experiments also included questions designed to determine if the participants understood the differences between the factors under control, manipulation checks. Significant differences between the levels of the experimentally controlled variables or significant differences for the manipulation check questions provide evidence for statistical validity. Combined, these elements of the experiments provide ample evidence of internal validity for the experiments.

External validity relates to how generalizable the experiment results are and results from the strength of the linkage between the predictions of theory and the results of repeated experiments (Morton and Williams (2008)). The hypotheses for each experiment were grounded on established theories. Multiple experiments with results consistent with the founding theories would bolster the external validity of each experiment. Each consistent result strengthens the previous results until the concepts are accepted as externally valid.

Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) program connected researchers to participants. Researchers required participants to be from the United States, past their eighteenth birthday, and able to read English. Amazon's program only allowed qualified personnel access to the recruitment information. Initial recruitment of participants was through a simple advertisement indicating the title and general requirements of the survey. If the potential participant indicated interest in completing the survey, he or she next saw a detailed, Institutional Review Board-approved recruitment statement and information sheet explaining the research and its possible benefits and consequences.

The result of the MTurk recruitment process was a convenience sample. Concerns exist about the quality of data produced by online surveys, but Ramsey et al. (2016) found MTurk workers comparable to undergraduate research participants in item recognition accuracy and attentiveness. They also found MTurk workers more likely to read survey instructions. Studies by Bentley, Daskalova and White (2017) and Kees et al. (2017) found responses from MTurk to be reliable and comparable to professional data collection services for studies of marketing and advertising. Such research gave confidence in the quality of survey results MTurk workers produced.

After choosing to continue to the survey, participants in each experiment received a random assignment into one of eight treatments. Researchers required each survey participant to read a short scenario and answer several questions about his or her level of support for the operation, the factors related to determining the level of support, and demographic information. Each participant received appropriate compensation for their approximately 10-minute effort.

1.4.1 Nesting of Experiments

Each of the three experiments explored a different aspect of public support. The first experiment focused on cost-benefit factors. The second experiment focused on value-based factors. The third experiment addressed the elements of support for non-combat operations once leaders chose them as the means to address a crisis.

1.4.2 Experiment 1 - The Influence of Costs and Benefits

The first experiment explored how the cost and benefit aspects of a situation influence the support of combat and non-combat operations. The experiment manipulated the response to an international crisis as being either combat or noncombat, the response's cost type as being primarily human (casualties) or financial, and its probability of success as being high or low. Appendix A includes the scenarios and survey questions used in the experiment.

	Combat Operations		Non-Combat Operations	
	Success Low %	Success High %	Success Low %	Success High %
Human Cost	Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Scenario 5	Scenario 6
Financial Cost	Scenario 3	Scenario 4	Scenario 7	Scenario 8

Figure 1.3: Influence of the Cost-Benefit Factors on Support

Analysis of the experiment data proceeded in four steps. The base model of the experiment determined if the experiment factors or any interaction of them influence support. A combination of Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and linear regression provided information on the strength and significance of the factors' influence. The second step of the analysis was to use factor analysis based on additional questions in the survey to identify latent elements of a personal belief set; philosophical operational code beliefs, instrumental operational code beliefs, and ideology. The third step was to demonstrate the influence of the resulting variables on public support using regression analysis. The final step required combining the models using regression analysis to determine the contingent influence of situation factors.

1.4.3 Experiment 2 - The Influence of Values in Support

The second experiment explored the influence of values on the generation of support for combat and non-combat operations. The experiment manipulated the response to an international crisis as being either combat or noncombat, how sympathetic to the country of interest the participant was by presenting different levels of victimization in the situation, and the relationship between the country of interest and the United States as being friendly or challenging[12]. Appendix B includes the scenarios and survey questions used in the experiment.

	Combat Operations		Non-Combat Operations	
	Sympathy Low	Sympathy High	Sympathy Low	Sympathy High
Friendly Relations	Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Scenario 5	Scenario 6
Challenging Relations	Scenario 3	Scenario 4	Scenario 7	Scenario 8

Figure 1.4: Influence of Values-Based Factors on Support

Analysis of the experiment data again proceeded in four steps. The base model of the experiment determined if the experiment factors or any interaction of them influence support. A combination of ANOVA and linear regression provided information on the strength and significance of the factors' influence. The second step of the analysis was to use factor analysis based on additional questions in the survey to identify latent elements of a personal belief set; philosophical operational code beliefs, instrumental operational code beliefs, and ideology. The third step was to demonstrate the influence of the resulting variables on public support using regression analysis. The final step required combining the models using regression analysis to determine the contingent

[12]The purpose of sympathy generation is to assess the influence of the latent concept of morality on the decisions in the experiment.(Eisenberg (2000); Batson et al. (1997))

influence of situation factors.

1.4.4 Experiment 3 - Inside Support for Noncombat Operations

Rather than examining the differences between support for combat and noncombat, the third experiment explored the nature of public support after leaders chose noncombat operations in response to a crisis. The scenarios provided a contrast of purpose for the operation, humanitarian contrasted with national security interest; high and low costs; and different government functions as assistance recipients, military or civilian institutions. Inclusion of the recipient factor tied to the trend for characteristics of the other to have influence on public support in both foreign aid and conflict literature. It is possible the public would consider military-to-military relationships as the only acceptable role for the U.S. military's interaction with the recipient country. The public may view aiding civilian elements as being outside the military's purview. The public may deem such missions more appropriate for other governmental elements such as the Department of State or the U.S. Agency for International Development. Finally, concerns regarding the militarization of the relationship the United States has with foreign civilian governments may influence support (Krahenbuhl et al. (2011); *SCHR Position Paper on Humanitarian-Military Relations* (2010)). Some evidence indicates the public has uneasiness with developing foreign civilian capabilities, "nation-building," by the U.S. military. Polls from Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C. (2011) and Rasmussen Public Polling (2016) found support for such missions to be 45% and 28% respectively.[13] Including the factor provided an opportunity to explore whether the difference is important. Appendix C includes the scenarios and survey questions used in the experiment.

[13]The Pew poll asked "In Afghanistan and Iraq, the military has been asked to engage in noncombat missions like reconstruction and operations designed to strengthen the country's social, political and economic institutions, sometimes called "nation building." Do you think these are appropriate roles or inappropriate roles for the military?" while the Rasmussen poll asked "The United States in both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations has pursued a foreign policy that includes a more aggressive effort to establish democracies in Middle Eastern countries by use of the U.S. military and U.S. financial support. This policy is commonly referred to as nation building. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. government continuing its nation-building efforts?"

	National Security		Humanitarian	
	High Cost	Low Cost	High Cost	Low Cost
Civil Development	Scenario 3	Scenario 4	Scenario 5	Scenario 8
Military Development	Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Scenario 6	Scenario 7

Figure 1.5: Specific Factors Influencing Non-Combat Operations

Once again, analysis of the experiment data proceeded in four steps. The base model of the experiment determined if the controlled factors or any interaction of them influence support. A combination of ANOVA and linear regression provided information on the strength and significance of the factors' influence. The second step of the analysis was to use factor analysis based on additional questions in the survey to identify a latent element of a personal belief set; instrumental operational code beliefs. Ideological and philosophical operational code beliefs information was not available in the third experiment's survey. The third step was to demonstrate the influence of the resulting variables on public support using regression analysis. The final step required combining the models using regression analysis to determine the contingent influence of situation factors.

1.5 Expectations

Three broad expectations result from the previous discussion of theory. First, each situation factor has its own theoretically justified expectation for having influence on public support in the pure experiments. Combat should be less popular than noncombat. In the first experiment, human costs and lower success should decrease public support regardless of the policy option selection. In the second experiment, friendly relations and a high-sympathy situation should increase public support for either combat or noncombat. Finally, in the third experiment, a humanitarian purpose and military recipients should increase public support while high costs decrease it. The second expectation if for both instrumental operational code belief variables, those related to pragmatic elements of preference formation, and philosophical operational code belief variables, those relat-

ing a current situation to an internally-held ideal, should influence public support of an action. The final expectation is for those situation factors closely tied to identifiable values will remain significant despite the inclusion of potentially mitigating elements. Situation factors related to saving human lives and indicating a close relationship will have influence beyond that explained by the elements in the model conceptually related to them.

1.6 Contributions

This research adds several contributions to the current International Relations literature. First, it provides insights into the relationship between the public support for combat and the public support for noncombat when responding to an international crisis. Second, it expands the Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) framework to include how a personal belief set influences the preference for a response. Finally, it leverages operational code belief logic to explore what types of situation factors remain influential after accounting for a personal belief sets.

2. THE INFLUENCE OF COSTS AND BENEFITS

2.1 Experiment on Costs and Benefits Factors

The first experiment explored how cost and benefit factors of a situation influenced the public support of a U.S. military operation. Exploration of research into public support for foreign policy, particularly foreign aid and conflict, indicated three trends occur in both. One of those trends was practical. For foreign aid, the strategic importance of the recipient country, the potential for the recipient country to become an economic partner, and the ability to absorb the financial costs of aid as a function of the donor country's income level or wealth influenced public support (Otter (2003); Fink and Redaelli (2011); Paxton and Knack (2012); Milner and Tingley (2013)). Expected success and costs influenced public support for participation in conflict (Gartner and Segura (1998); Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2006); Eichenberg (2005)). Should the practical trend continue for non-combat operations, the level of success of an operation would change the public support it receives.

Under the practical trend costs should also influence public support, but the type of cost may matter due to another trend, morality. In foreign aid research, recognition of genuine need, a spirit of generosity, and a commitment to altruism each increased public support (Mosley (1985); Otter (2003); Fink and Redaelli (2011); Paxton and Knack (2012)). In conflict research, the justification for action and policy objective pursued influenced public support. Action the public saw as justified or a policy objective to intercede on humanitarian grounds or to restrain an aggressive act found increased public support (Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009); Jentleson and Britton (1998); Oneal, Lian and Joyner (1996); Eichenberg (2005)). According to Tetlock et al. (2000) and consistent with Miller and Barber IV (2016), placing human costs, considered infinitely valuable, in contrast with financial costs will result in different levels of public support.

It is possible the trends exist because of the influence of the personal belief set of an individual.

Tetlock (1986) argued individuals bring values to bear when forming preferences. Those could be based on philosophical and instrumental operational code beliefs leading to normative and pragmatic influences beyond the specifics of the situation. If so, they would have influence on public support separately from the factors of the situation and could alter the influence of situation factors.

2.2 Experimental Design

The first experiment explored the influence of costs and benefits on the public support for combat and noncombat responses to an international crisis generated. The research used a 2x2x2 between-groups factorial experimental design to vary the type of crisis response, the probability of success, and the type of cost. Each participant received one of eight treatments after random assignment to it.

	Combat Operations		Non-Combat Operations	
	Success Low %	Success High %	Success Low %	Success High %
Human Cost	Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Scenario 5	Scenario 6
Financial Cost	Scenario 3	Scenario 4	Scenario 7	Scenario 8

Figure 2.1: Influence of the Rational Factors on Support

2.3 Experiment Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: Higher probabilities of success will generate more support than lower probabilities of success.

Rational choice expectations led to the first hypothesis about how the factors influence support for the mission. In terms of rational decision making, higher probabilities of success equate to

more benefit. As a result, all else being equal, participants will prefer to support success.

Hypothesis 2: Human costs will generate less support than financial costs.

Norms reflective of philosophical operational code beliefs will also influence public support. Experiments based on the Sacred Value Protection Model in Tetlock et al. (2000) found moral outrage at the concept of trade-offs between human life and money. The response indicated money was unacceptable to exchange for life and as such human costs should produce lower support for an action.

Hypothesis 3: Combat operations will generate less support than noncombat operations.

The avoidance of war is a normative, ought to be, preference founded in multiple moral traditions of western society according to Johnson (2017).

Hypothesis 4: Elements reflective of normative philosophical operational code beliefs and pragmatic instrumental operational code beliefs will have influence on public support beyond the effects of the situational factors.[1,2]

Hypothesis 5: In a combined model, operational code beliefs will alter the influence of the situation factors, but situation factors related to values will retain direct influence while factors related to pragmatic elements will not.[3]

[1]The section on Parsing Operational Code Beliefs in this chapter will address which variables relate to instrumental operational code beliefs and which relate to philosophical operational code beliefs.

[2]The specific weighting characteristics resulting from the factor analysis process will determine the variable's influence directionality.

[3]Theoretical expectations will continue to define directionality for the situation factors retaining influence.

2.4 Data Generation

2.4.1 Participants

MTurk[4] provided 1,192 unique completed survey responses. The following analysis included all survey responses, including low quality responses.[5] Participant demographics differed from those of the U.S. population. Survey participants included more women and were slightly younger than the broader population. They were also more educated with a large majority holding a Bachelor's or advanced degree. Finally, the participants identified themselves as an Independent or Democrat at a higher rate and a Republican at a lower rate than the population.

Table 2.1: Participant and U.S. Population Demographics

Characteristic	Participant	Population
Median Age	31-35 range	37.9 years
Percent Female	54.2%	50.8%
Median Income	$50-62k range	57,617
Bachelor's or Advanced Degree	65%	30%
Democrat/Indep/Republican	33/54/13%	27/42/28%

All population data except political affiliation are from the U.S. Census Bureau for 2016.
Political affiliation data are from Gallup poll responses contemporaneous with the researcher's survey.

[4]See the discussion of MTurk in the Research Plan.

[5]Examples of low quality responses included 43 participants who took less than three minutes to complete the entire survey process, 77 who took less than 10 seconds to read the approximately 220 word scenario, and a small number who produced responses without variance in their values, for example every response was a "1". Significant overlap between the groups existed. As an example, 29 of the 77 respondents who took less than 10 seconds to read also completed the entire process in less than three minutes. Each scenario had similar numbers of low quality responses. Retaining these responses in the analysis increased the error associated with the results and thus strengthened the evidence for any significant findings.

2.4.2 Experimental Factors

2.4.2.1 Situation

Each treatment began by introducing the participant to a situation wherein one country attacked and occupied a neighboring country. The occupied country then asked the United States for help with the situation. The treatments varied the type of response, the expected level of success of the response, and the primary type of costs for the response.

2.4.2.2 $ActionType$

The experiment varied the type of response to the crisis. Participants received a treatment indicating a combat response or a noncombat response:

1. Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States approved increased sales of military equipment at reduced cost, the transfer of excess defense equipment, and the deployment of a large number of personnel in a non-combat role to improve the training and capabilities of Country A's military.

2. Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States military deployed a large and capable combat force to the area. In cooperation with Country A, the U.S. military will conduct combat operations using any force necessary to drive Country B from the territory it occupied.

2.4.2.3 $SuccessLevel$

To manipulate the level of success, the treatments included one of two statements:

1. Despite the combined efforts of the United States and Country A to force Country B from the territory it took, the probability they will be able to achieve their objectives is low, estimated to be 10%. Country B is likely to remain in control of the territory it invaded for the

foreseeable future.

2. With the combined efforts of the United States and Country A aimed at forcing Country B from the territory it took, the probability they will be able to achieve their objectives is high, estimated to be 90%. The resulting strategic situation will restore the previous border while reducing Country B's ability to threaten its neighbor for the foreseeable future.

2.4.2.4 $CostType$

Finally, to experimentally introduce costs, the research contrasted human costs, casualties, against financial costs. The text the participants read gave one of two situations about the costs of the operations:

1. Experts assess the nature of fighting and environment will result in few casualties during any effort to retake the captured territory. Specifically, few, if any, American casualties will occur. In effect, there will be no human cost (casualties) to the United States' actions beyond those expected had the personnel remained at their home stations to train. The financial cost of the operation, however, will be significantly higher than leaving the forces at home. The vast majority of the costs to the United States will be financial costs rather than human costs (casualties).

2. Strong support from international organizations will result in full payment for U.S. military participation, equipment, etc. used in the crisis response. In effect, the financial cost to the United States will be no different than leaving the forces at home to train. The human cost in casualties, however, is expected to be significantly higher than leaving the American personnel at home. The vast majority of the costs to the United States will be human costs (casualties) rather than financial ones.

2.4.3 Parsing Operational Code Beliefs

In addition to the experimental factors, the survey asked several additional questions. The questions explored the participant's personal belief set. Some of the questions addressed the overall benefit to the United States as well as the specific short- and long-term difference the action will make. Other questions addressed the importance of human costs, the morality of acting, what the participant felt for the country of interest, the participant's political worldview, and demographics.

A principal component factor analysis on several of these variables generated three identifiable latent concepts. The rotated factor weights are in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2: Factor Analysis Rotated Weights

Variable	$Instrumental$	$Philosophical$	$Worldview$
Benefit to the U.S.	**0.6747**	-0.2744	0.2582
Difference the mission makes in the short run	**0.8651**	0.0394	0.0481
Difference the mission makes in the long run	**0.8532**	0.1429	0.1640
Human costs	-0.0937	**0.6999**	-0.1609
Morality of taking action	0.2064	**0.7494**	0.2364
How participant felt for the foreign country	-0.0183	**0.7873**	0.1367
Isolationist perspective	-0.0770	-0.0380	**-0.8894**
Internationalist perspective	0.2008	0.1205	**0.8483**
Eigen Value	2.02943	1.78445	1.70700

The personal belief set variables separated into factors corresponding to operational code beliefs and political ideology. $Instrumental$ weighted questions related to instrumental operational code beliefs. The first variable, $benefit$ was the response to the question, ""How much benefit does the United States get from participating in this mission?" A score of zero indicated "None" and a score of 10 indicated "A great Deal." The $msnsrt$ variable was the score the participant gave in response to the question "How much of a difference do you expect this mission to make in the

short run?" Similarly, the $msnlng$ variable was the response to "How much of a difference do you expect this mission to make in the long run?" Each of these questions explored how the participant considered the effectiveness of the action. They reflected instrumental operational code beliefs, those focused on the mechanics of a process. Table 2.3 shows the heavily weighted questions by operational code belief.

The second factor, $Philosophical$, weighted variables related to values. Each of these variables reflected questions addressing what the participant believed ought to be when comparing the situation to an ideal. Mrl was a measure of the level of moral concern the participant had about the situation. The sum of the responses to two questions formed the measure. The first question, "The actions of Country B (the attacker) are..." provided information about the participant's perspective on the morality of the attack. A score of zero indicated "Morally Right" and a score of 10 indicated "Morally Wrong." The second question, "Helping Country A (the country that was attacked in the situation) would be..." provided information about the participant's perspective on assistance. A score of zero indicated "Highly Immoral" and a score of 10 indicated "Highly Moral." The sum reflected the combination of aversion to the attacker's action and sanction of action in response. The $anyhum$ variable addressed the concept of human costs, not the specific costs of the mission under assessment. The participant responded to "When considering the costs of any military action, how important are human costs (casualties)?" with a score ranging from zero indicating "Not At All" to 10 indicating "A Very Important Cost." Finally, $feelb4$ recorded the response to the question, "Considering the situation, how would you feel toward Country A (the country that was attacked) before any American involvement?" A response of "Happy for Them" was a zero score and "Bad for Them" was a 10 on the scale. The normative nature of the cluster reflected philosophical operational code beliefs.

The third factor addressed the political perspective of the participant. The variables $isol$ and $intnat$ provided measures of the participant's political ideological worldview. The respective ques-

Table 2.3: Operational Code Belief by Heavily Weighted Questions

Factor Result	Survey Questions	Related Questions from George (1969)
Instrumental	How much benefit does the United States get from participating in this mission?	How are goals pursued most effectively?
	How much of a difference do you expect this mission to make in the short run?	What is the utility and role of different means?
	How much of a difference do you expect this mission to make in the short run?	What is the utility and role of different means?
Philosophical	The actions of Country B (the attacker) are... (Morally Right... Morally Wrong)	What is the essential nature of political life?
	Helping Country A (the country that was attacked in the situation) would be... (Highly Immoral... Highly Moral)	How much control of historical development does an individual have?
	When considering the costs of any military action, how important are human costs (casualties)?	What is the essential nature of political life?
	Considering the situation, how would you feel toward Country A (the country that was attacked) before any American involvement?	How much control of historical development does an individual have?
Political Ideology	The United States should focus on itself and reduce its involvement with other countries.	
	The United States has a responsibility to shape the international environment and to engage with other countries.	

tions were: "The United States should focus on itself and reduce its involvement with other countries." and "The United States has a responsibility to shape the international environment and to engage with other countries." For each, a score of zero indicated "Completely Disagree" while a score of 10 indicated "Completely Agree."

2.5 Modeling the Relationship Between the Situation and a Personal Belief Set

Exploring the relationship between the situation and a personal belief set required the use of several models. The first model addressed the direct influence of situation factors on public sup-

port.

$$\begin{aligned} Support =& \beta_1 ActionType + \beta_2 CostType + \beta_3 SuccessLevel + \beta_4 SuccessLevel \times CostType \\ &+ \beta_5 SuccessLevel \times ActionType + \beta_6 ActionType \times CostType \\ &+ \beta_7 SuccessLevel \times CostType \times ActionType + \beta_8 Constant + \epsilon \end{aligned}$$

The Situation model assessed whether the experimental factors or any of their interactions influenced the level of support for the response to the crisis in the scenario. Each variable was categorical as the section on the experimental factors discussed.

The Personal Belief Set model assessed whether the operational code belief and ideological worldview variables had direct influence on public support. It also included a measure of personal politics. $Polspec$ measured where on a spectrum from "Staunchly Liberal" to "Staunchly Conservative" a participant reported him or her self[6, 7].

$$\begin{aligned} Support =& \beta_1 Instrumental + \beta_2 Philosophical + \beta_3 Worldview + \\ &+ \beta_4 Polspec + \beta_5 Constant + \epsilon \end{aligned}$$

Finally, the Full model combined the Situation and Personal Belief Set models.

$$\begin{aligned} Support =& \beta_1 ActionType + \beta_2 CostType + \beta_3 SuccessLevel + \beta_4 Instrumental \\ &+ \beta_5 Philosophical + \beta_6 Worldview + \beta_7 Polspec + \beta_8 SuccessLevel \times CostType \\ &+ \beta_9 SuccessLevel \times ActionType + \beta_{10} ActionType \times CostType \\ &+ \beta_{11} SuccessLevel \times CostType \times ActionType + \beta_{12} Constant + \epsilon \end{aligned}$$

This model allowed an exploration of how the Personal Belief Set variables altered the influence of the situation factors.

[6] Demographic variables including sex, age, income, education, and military participation were not significant.

[7] An attempt to include $Polspec$ in the factor analysis resulted in it loading on its own factor. It did not load onto $Wordlview$.

2.6 Results

The purpose of the experiment was to determine if the situation factors influenced the support for the response to the crisis. Figure 2.2 presents the mean, standard deviation, and number of participants for each scenario and Figure 2.3 presents the same information by experiment factor. Type III ANOVA analysis was appropriate for examining the Situation model. Type III ANOVA calculates the sum of squares for each factor given the levels of other factors and all interactions. It is appropriate when the data are unbalanced or when an interaction is significant. Both conditions apply in the Situation model. All of the analyses used Helmert contrasts for the factor variables. Helmert contrasts are appropriate to create orthogonal factors from unbalanced data. Consequently, the Helmert contrast was proper for the analyses. Table 2.4 shows the results of the ANOVA on the Situation model indicate all three factors influenced the support decision as did the interaction of $SuccessLevel$ and $ActionType$. Figure 2.4 depicts the effects of the factors on $Support$ graphically.

	Combat		Noncombat	
	Success Low %	Success High %	Success Low %	Success High %
Human Costs	Mean = 4.60 Std Dev = 2.95 n = 150	Mean = 6.67 Std Dev = 2.70 n = 151	Mean = 5.53 Std Dev = 3.09 n = 146	Mean = 6.13 Std Dev = 3.02 n = 150
Financial Costs	Mean = 5.36 Std Dev = 3.11 n = 146	Mean = 7.01 Std Dev = 2.66 n = 141	Mean = 6.02 Std Dev = 3.01 n = 156	Mean = 7.16 Std Dev = 2.67 n = 152

Figure 2.2: Support Scores by Scenario

	SuccessLevel		*CostType*		*ActionType*	
	Low	High	Financial	Human	Combat	Noncombat
Support	5.38	6.74	6.38	5.74	5.90	6.22
(Std Dev)	(3.07)	(2.79)	(2.96)	(3.03)	(3.02)	(3.00)
n	598	594	595	597	588	604

Figure 2.3: Support Scores by Factor and Level

Table 2.4: Experiment 1 ANOVA

	Dependent variable:			
	Support			
	Sum Sq	Df	F value	Pr(>F)
$ActionType$	26	1	3.1289	0.0771725^{*}
$SuccessLevel$	556	1	65.7843	$1.247e-15^{***}$
$CostType$	128	1	15.1762	0.0001034^{***}
$ActionType \times SuccessLevel$	73	1	8.5966	0.0034326^{***}
$ActionType \times CostType$	3	1	0.3668	0.5448511
$SuccessLevel \times CostType$	0	1	0.0291	0.8644716
$ActionTypes \times CostType \times SuccessLevel$	17	1	1.9899	0.1586099
(Intercept)	43745	1	5178.3786	$< 2.2e-16^{***}$
Residuals	10002	1184		

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01







Figure 2.4: Effects of Situation Factors on $Support$

The ANOVA results indicated the situation factors were influential, but regression analysis can provide further insight into the influence of the factors and of the other model elements the survey captured. The results of regression analysis on all three models are in Table 2.5.

Table 2.5: Experiment 1 Model Regression Results

	Dependent variable:		
	Support		
	Situation	Personal Belief Set	Full
$ActionType$	-0.149^{*}		-0.121^{**}
	(0.084)		(0.058)
$SuccessLevel$	0.683^{***}		-0.048
	(0.084)		(0.067)
$CostType$	-0.328^{***}		-0.304^{***}
	(0.084)		(0.058)
$Instrumental$		1.703^{***}	1.712^{***}
		(0.059)	(0.067)
$Philosophical$		0.126^{**}	0.137^{**}
		(0.059)	(0.058)
$Worldview$		1.378^{***}	1.372^{***}
		(0.060)	(0.059)
$Polspec$		0.142^{***}	0.145^{***}
		(0.022)	(0.022)
$ActionType \times SuccessLevel$	0.247^{***}		0.116^{**}
	(0.084)		(0.058)
$ActionType \times CostType$	0.051		-0.051
	(0.084)		(0.058)
$SuccessLevel \times CostType$	-0.014		0.002
	(0.084)		(0.058)
$ActionType \times SuccessLevel$	0.119		0.044
$\times CostType$	(0.084)		(0.058)
$Constant$	6.060^{***}	5.323^{***}	5.307^{***}
	(0.084)	(0.127)	(0.126)
Observations	1,192	1,192	1,192
R^2	0.074	0.546	0.560
Adjusted R^2	0.069	0.544	0.556
Residual Std. Error	2.906 (df = 1184)	2.034 (df = 1187)	2.007 (df = 1180)
F Statistic	13.541^{***} (df = 7; 1184)	356.323^{***} (df = 4; 1187)	136.437^{***} (df = 11; 1180)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

2.7 Analysis of Results

The ANOVA and regression analysis on the Situation model provided strong evidence for *Hypothesis 1* and *Hypothesis 2*. Higher success levels increased public support for actions while human costs decreased support as compared to financial costs.[8] The main effect of the contrast between a noncombat response and a combat response did not achieve significance at the traditional $p = 0.05$ level. The interaction of a combat response with the level of success factor was significant. Figure 2.4 depicts success was more important to public support during combat operations than during noncombat operations.

The low R^2 of the Situation model was expected. The intent of analysis of experimental factors was to confirm they had influence through either main effects or interaction effects. Significant ANOVA results or regression coefficients provided this confirmation. Experimental manipulation allowed specific attribution of causality, model total explanatory power was not the intent. Despite the lack of total explanatory power, the regression analysis provided insight into the magnitude of change caused by each experimental factor. Figure 2.5 shows the regression coefficients. Those coefficients were the direct influence of the experiment factors on public support. Comparing those coefficients to the coefficients in the full model allowed assessment of *Hypothesis 5*.

[8]Removing the interactions from the model had no relevant influence on the main effects of any experiment factor in any model.



Figure 2.5: Situation Model Coefficients with 95% Confidence Intervals

The results on the Personal Belief Set model provided strong evidence for *Hypothesis 4*. Each of the variables showed direct influence on public support. Figure 2.6 provides the coefficients. The pragmatic element associated with instrumental operational code beliefs was more influential than the normative philosophical operational code belief-related variable. This result was consistent with the expectations of the Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) framework. The political and ideological worldview variable and the position on a political spectrum also had influence.



Figure 2.6: Personal Belief Set Model Coefficients with 95% Confidence Intervals

The factor analysis weighting scheme from Table 2.2 for each factor variable provided sufficient guidance to usefully interpret them. Participants who considered the action in the scenario beneficial to the United States or as making a difference in the short-term, long-term, or both lent more support to the response. The significance and directionality of the normative, philosophical operational code belief-related, variable indicated lower human costs, stronger moral justification and feeling worse for the country of interest increased public support for the response in the scenario. Less isolationist or increased internationalist perspective on political ideology increased public support for the response. Finally, the political position interpretation was simple. As the participant became more politically conservative, support for the response increased.

The Full model provided the ability to assess how the inclusion of the Personal Belief Set model variables altered the influence of the experimental factors from the baselines set in the Situation model. Three key aspects of the Full model results required explanation: absence of significance for the level of success experiment factor, the emergence of the significance of the response policy choice, and the character of the experiment factors retaining influence despite the

inclusion of related operational code belief and worldview elements in the model. Figure 2.7 shows the contingent influence of the factors.[9]



Figure 2.7: Full Model Coefficients with 95% Confidence Intervals

The coefficient on the success factor dropped from 0.68308 significant at the $p = 0.001$ level to a magnitude of -0.047986 and insignificant in the model. This result was consistent with the significant influence of $Instrumental$, the variable associated with the instrumental operational code beliefs. The combination indicated the high or low level of success did not have independent influence on public support once a measure incorporating benefits, including making a short- and ling-term difference, was part of the model. The lack of independent influence after incorporating operational code belief variables was consistent with *Hypothesis 5*'s expectation only normative situation variables would remain significant.

[9]Removing the interactions from the model has negligible effects on the coefficients in the model. They remain in the model for consistency.

The second key aspect of the Full model was the significance of the policy choice variable. Once the model included instrumental and philosophical operational code beliefs, a clear policy preference against combat emerged as a main effect. While the combination of combat and high success continued to be significant, the combination of main effects for the situation factors and the interaction produced results indistinguishable from zero. The interaction added to public support, but each constituent element reduced public support. This result was also consistent with the expectations of *Hypothesis 5*.

The last situation variable dealt with the contrast of human and financial costs. The $CostType$ situation variable remained significant in the Full model. This result persisted from the Situation model with similar coefficients. The coefficient for the Situation model was -0.32809 and the coefficient for the Full model was -0.304174. Human costs had negative influence on public support despite the inclusion of the value of human costs in the philosophical operational code variable, $Philosophical$.

2.7.1 Mediation Analysis

One challenge of this research was assessing the directionality of the relationship between the situation and the personal beliefs. It is possible the beliefs shaped the interpretation of the situation. It is also possible the situation activated beliefs associated with it. This reality was why the arrow between them in the conceptual model was dual headed. For this experiment, the participants viewed the situation before being asked values-related questions. The arrow traveled from the situation to the belief set. Mediation analysis was necessary to determine how much effect on the influence of the situation factors the beliefs variables had.

The analysis required two steps as Imai, Keele and Yamamoto (2010) described. The first step was to determine if any of the situation factors predicted the values of the belief variables. Accomplishing this step required performing a regression using the belief variable as the dependent

variable and the Full model, excluding the belief variable of interest, as the explanatory model. The following equation was for the instrumental operational code belief variable[10]:

$$\begin{aligned} Instrumental =& \beta_1 ActionType + \beta_2 CostType + \beta_3 SuccessLevel + \beta_4 Philosophical \\ &+ \beta_5 Worldview + \beta_6 Polspec + \beta_7 SuccessLevel \times CostType \\ &+ \beta_8 SuccessLevel \times ActionType + \beta_9 ActionType \times CostType \\ &+ \beta_{10} SuccessLevel \times CostType \times ActionType + \beta_{11} Constant + \epsilon \end{aligned} \tag{2.1}$$

The results in Table 2.6 indicated $SuccessLevel$ predicted $Instrumental$ requiring continuation onto the second step, determining the Average Causal Mediation Effect (ACME) using the methods in Tingley et al. (2014).

[10]None of the experimental factors predicted the philosophical operational code belief variable. No further mediation analysis using it was necessary

Table 2.6: Mediation Step 1

	Dependent variable:
	$Instrumental$
$ActionType$	-0.016
	(0.025)
$SuccessLevel$	0.491^{***}
	(0.025)
$CostTyoe$	-0.026
	(0.025)
$Philosophical$	0.007
	(0.025)
$WorldView$	0.049^{*}
	(0.026)
$Polspec$	0.045^{***}
	(0.009)
$ActionType \times SuccessLevel$	0.050^{**}
	(0.025)
$ActionType \times CostType$	0.017
	(0.025)
$SuccessLevel \times CostType$	0.007
	(0.025)
$ActionType \times SuccessLevel \times CostType$	0.020
	(0.025)
$Constant$	-0.231^{***}
	(0.054)
Observations	1,192
R^2	0.256
Adjusted R^2	0.249
Residual Std. Error	0.866 (df = 1181)
F Statistic	40.586^{***} (df = 10; 1181)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The mediation calculations leveraged 1000 simulations to estimate the ACME using a bootstrapping technique. The results in Table 2.7 show the ACME, Total Effect, and Proportion Mediated were significant, but the experiment factor direct effect was not. These results indicate $Instrumental$ fully mitigated $SuccessLevel$. The experimental manipulation of the level of success no longer had direct influence after taking beliefs about the ends-means relationship into account.

Table 2.7: Mediation Calculation

	Estimate	95% Confidence Interval	$p-value$
Ave. Causal Mediation Effect	1.6813	1.4514-1.91	<2e-16***
Ave. Direct Effect	−0.0972	-0.3867-0.18	0.49
Total Effect	1.5842	1.3146-1.86	<2e-16***
Proportion Mediated	1.0613	0.8985-1.27	<2e-16***

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

2.8 Experiment 1 Conclusion

Experiment 1 provided several insights. First, the public prefers noncombat over combat when its preference process includes instrumental and philosophical operational code beliefs (*Hypothesis 3*). Second, differences in the situation of an international crisis matter to generating public support. The public will provide greater support for operations it expects to be successful (*Hypothesis 1*) and less support for those incurring human costs over financial costs (*Hypothesis 2*).

Experiment 1 also demonstrated both the value of operational code beliefs for influencing public support (*Hypothesis 4*) and what situation factors retain influence despite the inclusion of operational code beliefs in modeling. The factors retaining influence related to important values; combat is undesirable and human life is valuable (*Hypothesis 5*).

Finally, the factors important to determining public support for noncombat were essentially the same as for combat in this experiment. The participants preferred noncombat when incorporating operational code beliefs in preference formation, but the other elements driving the level of support were essentially the same for both policies.

3. THE INFLUENCE OF VALUES AND RELATIONSHIPS

3.1 Experiment on Value-Based Factors

The second experiment explored how value-based factors of a situation influenced the public support of a U.S. military operation. Exploration of research into public support for foreign policy, particularly foreign aid and conflict, indicated three trends occur in both. This experiment addressed two of the trends. One trend this experiment addressed was the character of the actors involved. Chong and Gradstein (2008) and Paxton and Knack (2012) found individual characteristics of both the recipient and the donor influenced public support for foreign aid. For example, if donors believed the recipients were responsible for being in need of aid, donor public support for it decreased. When considering conflict, Russett and Nincic (1976) identified how the identity of the country in need influenced support for a military defense of the country. Hetherington and Suhay (2011) and Kane and Norpoth (2017) found individual characteristics of the member of the public also altered support for conflict.

The second trend this experiment explored was moral. In foreign aid research, recognition of genuine need, a spirit of generosity, and a commitment to altruism each increased public support (Mosley (1985); Otter (2003); Fink and Redaelli (2011); Paxton and Knack (2012)). In conflict research, the justification for action and policy objective pursued influenced public support. Action the public saw as justified or a policy objective to intercede on humanitarian grounds or to restrain an other's aggressive foreign policy found increased public support (Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009); Jentleson and Britton (1998); Oneal, Lian and Joyner (1996); Eichenberg (2005); Jentleson (1992)).

It is possible the trends exist because of the influence of a personal belief set of an individual. Tetlock (1986) argued individuals bring values to bear when forming preferences. Those could be

based on philosophical and instrumental operational code beliefs leading to normative and pragmatic influences beyond the specifics of the situation. If so, they would have influence on public support separately from the factors of the situation and could alter the influence of situation factors.

3.2 Experimental Design

This research used the second experiment to explore the influence of situation factors related to values on the levels of support combat and noncombat responses to an international crisis. The research used a 2x2x2 between-groups factorial experimental design to manipulate the type of crisis response, the relationship between the United States and the country of interest, and the level of sympathy for the country of interest. Each participant received one of eight treatments after random assignment to it.

	Combat Operations		Non-Combat Operations	
	Sympathy Low	Sympathy High	Sympathy Low	Sympathy High
Friendly Relations	Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Scenario 5	Scenario 6
Challenging Relations	Scenario 3	Scenario 4	Scenario 7	Scenario 8

Figure 3.1: Influence of the Values-Based Factors on Support

3.3 Experiment Hypotheses

Each of the experimental factors related to values, however different theoretical justifications provided the hypotheses foundations.

Hypothesis 1: Friendly relations between the United States and the supported country will in-

crease the level of support.

Research by Mercer (1995), Geva and Hanson (1999), and Lyall (2010) found affinity via belonging to a common in-group or cultural similarity led to different behaviors when interacting with those in the group as compared to those outside it. The behaviors generally benefited or protected the in-group participant and as a result, being part of the in group could influence public support for actions deemed beneficial to another in the in group.

Hypothesis 2: High levels of sympathy for the country receiving assistance will produce a higher level of support than low levels of sympathy.

Eisenberg (2000) argued sympathy is related to morality and is other-centric and, according to Batson and Powell (2003), led to more pro-social responses.

Hypothesis 3: Combat operations will generate less support than noncombat operations.

The avoidance of war is a normative preference founded on multiple western moral traditions according to Johnson (2017). This hypothesis also is consistent with the findings on the Full model of the first experiment.

Hypothesis 4: Elements reflective of normative philosophical operational code beliefs and pragmatic instrumental operational code beliefs will have influence on public support.[1,2]

Hypothesis 5: In a combined model, operational code beliefs will alter the influence of the situation factors, but situation factors normatively treated as infinitely valuable will retain direct influence while factors related to instrumental elements will not.[3] Tetlock et al. (2000) used the value of one's children or friendships as examples of such infinitely valuable factors.

[1]The section on Parsing Operational Code Beliefs in this chapter will address which variables relate to instrumental operational code beliefs and which relate to philosophical operational code beliefs.

[2]The specific weighting characteristics resulting from the factor analysis process will determine the variable's influence directionality.

[3]Theoretical expectations will continue to define directionality for the situation factors retaining influence.

3.4 Data Generation

3.4.1 Participants

MTurk[4] provided 1,215 unique completed survey responses. The following analysis included all survey responses, including low quality responses.[5] Participant demographics differed from those of the U.S. population. Survey participants were slightly younger than the broader population. They were also more educated with a large majority holding a Bachelor's or advanced degree. Finally, the participants identified themselves as an Independent or Democrat at a higher rate and a Republican at a lower rate than the population.

Table 3.1: Participant and U.S. Population Demographics

Characteristic	Participant	Population
Median Age	31-35 range	37.9 years
Percent Female	50.4%	50.8%
Median Income	$50-62k range	57,617
Bachelor's or Advanced Degree	62%	30%
Democrat/Indep/Republican	31/54/15%	27/42/28%

All population data except political affiliation are from the U.S. Census Bureau for 2016
Political affiliation data are from Gallup poll responses contemporaneous with the researcher's survey.

[4]See the discussion of MTurk in the Research Plan.

[5]Examples of low quality responses included 47 participants who took less than three minutes to complete the entire survey process, 99 who took less than 10 seconds to read the approximately 150 word scenario, and a small number who produced responses without variance in their values, for example every response was a "1". Significant overlap between the groups existed. As an example, 38 of the 99 respondents who took less than 10 seconds to read also completed the entire process in less than three minutes. Each scenario had similar numbers of low quality responses. Retaining these responses in the analysis increased the error associated with the results and thus strengthened the evidence for any significant findings.

3.4.2 Experimental Factors

3.4.2.1 Situation

Each treatment presented the participant with a situation wherein one country attacked and occupied a neighboring country. The occupied country then asked the United States for help with the situation. The treatments varied the type of response, the relationship between the United States and the country of interest, and how sympathetic a victim the country of interest was.

3.4.2.2 $Friend$

To vary the level of the relationship between the United States and the country of interest in the scenario, the treatments included one of two statements:

1. The United States and Country A have a challenging relationship. The populations see little common in their cultures and values. At the same time, Country A and the United States have few common economic and political interests and rarely cooperate on international matters.

2. The United States has friendly relations with Country A. The populations share culture and values. The United States and Country A have common economic and political interests resulting in regular cooperation in international matters.

3.4.2.3 $Sympathy$

To experimentally manipulate sympathy, the research contrasted scenarios with different levels of victimization of the country of interest. The text the participants read gave one of two situations:

1. Country A and Country B have been long-term rivals due to a disagreement about the correct placement of their shared border. Following a series of escalating provocations including strong words from political leaders and small but tense military standoffs, Country B

attacked and took control of the portion of the disputed area in Country A.

2. A natural disaster recently struck Country A resulting in large numbers of casualties and wide-spread damage to its infrastructure and governing capabilities. Country B, its neighbor, used the situation as an opportunity to invade Country A based on claims Country A stole lands from Country B. This is an absolute lie and Country B is known as an international bully and bad actor. The attack came without warning and resulted in large numbers of civilian and military casualties in Country A.

3.4.2.4 $ActionType$

Finally, the experiment varied the type of response to the crisis. Participants received a treatment indicating a combat response or a noncombat response:

1. Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States approved increased sales of military equipment at reduced cost, the transfer of excess defense equipment, and the deployment of a large number of personnel in a non-combat role to improve the training and capabilities of Country A's military.

2. Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States military deployed a large and capable combat force to the area. In cooperation with Country A, the U.S. military will conduct combat operations using any force necessary to drive Country B from the territory it occupied.

3.4.3 Parsing Operational Code Beliefs

In addition to the experimental factors, the survey asked several additional questions. The questions explored the participant's personal belief set. Some of the questions addressed how justified

in acting the United States was, the expected success level of the response, the overall benefit to the United States as well as the specific short- and long-term difference the action will make. Other questions addressed the importance of human costs, the morality of acting, what the participant felt for the country of interest, the participant's political worldview, and demographics.

A principal component factor analysis on several of these variables generated three identifiable latent concepts. The rotated factor weights are in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Factor Analysis Rotated Weights

Variable	$Instrumental$	$Worldview$	$Philosophical$
How justified in taking action the U.S. was	**0.6181**	0.4270	0.3294
Benefit to the U.S.	**0.5406**	0.2372	-0.1968
Expected level of success for the mission	**0.7941**	0.0952	-0.0446
Difference the mission makes in the short run	**0.7611**	0.1431	0.1464
Difference the mission makes in the long run	**0.7656**	0.1749	0.1948
Human costs	-0.1213	-0.1119	**0.7299**
Morality of taking action	0.3915	0.2295	**0.6971**
How participant felt for the foreign country	0.1206	0.1406	**0.7420**
Isolationist perspective	-0.0690	**-0.8874**	-0.0262
Internationalist perspective	0.2825	**0.7893**	0.1137
Eigen Value	2.73738	1.79413	1.79136

The personal belief set variables separated into factors corresponding to operational code beliefs and political ideology. $Instrumental$ weighted questions related to instrumental operational code beliefs. The first variable, $justify$ was the response to the question, "The United States actions in the situation are..." A score of zero indicated "Totally Unjustified" while a 10 indicated "Completely Justified." $benefit$ was the response to the question, ""How much benefit does the United States get from participating in this mission?" A score of zero indicated "None" and a score of 10 indicated "A great Deal." The scenarios did not provide any information on the level of

success the action may have. The variable $expsucc$ captured information on success through the question, "What do you think the chances are the operation will successfully return the situation to the conditions before the attack?" The respondent provided a response in 10% increments between zero and 100%. The $msnsrt$ variable was the score the participant gave in response to the question "How much of a difference do you expect this mission to make in the short run?" Similarly, the $msnlng$ variable was the response to "How much of a difference do you expect this mission to make in the long run?" Each of these questions explored how the participant considered the effectiveness of the action. They reflected instrumental operational code beliefs, those focused on the mechanics of a process. Table 3.3 shows the heavily weighted questions by operational code belief.

The second factor addressed the political perspective of the participant. The variables $isol$ and $intnat$ provided measures of the participant's political ideological worldview. The respective questions were: "The United States should focus on itself and reduce its involvement with other countries." and "The United States has a responsibility to shape the international environment and to engage with other countries." For each, a score of zero indicated "Completely Disagree" while a score of 10 indicated "Completely Agree."

Finally, the third factor, $Philosophical$, weighted variables related to values. Each of these variables reflected questions addressing what the participant believed ought to be when comparing the situation to an ideal. Mrl was a measure of the level of moral concern the participant had about the situation. The sum of the responses to two questions formed the measure. The first question, "The actions of Country B (the attacker) are..." provided information about the participant's perspective on the morality of the attack. A score of zero indicated "Morally Right" and a score of 10 indicated "Morally Wrong." The second question, "Helping Country A (the country that was attacked in the situation) would be..." provided information about the participant's perspective on assistance. A score of zero indicated "Highly Immoral" and a score of 10 indicated "Highly Moral." The sum reflected the combination of aversion to the attacker's action and sanction of

action in response. The $anyhum$ variable addressed the concept of human costs, not the specific costs of the mission under assessment. The participant responded to "When considering the costs of any military action, how important are human costs (casualties)?" with a score ranging from zero indicating "Not At All" to 10 indicating "A Very Important Cost." Finally, $feelb4$ recorded the response to the question, "Considering the situation, how would you feel toward Country A (the country that was attacked) before any American involvement?" A response of "Happy for Them" was a zero score and "Bad for Them" was a 10 on the scale. The normative nature of the cluster reflected philosophical operational code beliefs.

Table 3.3: Operational Code Belief by Heavily Weighted Questions

Factor Result	Survey Questions	Related Questions from George (1969)
Instrumental	The United States actions in the situation are... (Totally Unjustified...Completely Justified)	How are goals pursued most effectively?
	How much benefit does the United States get from participating in this mission?	What is the utility and role of different means?
	What do you think the chances are the operation will successfully return the situation to the conditions before the attack?	How are goals pursued most effectively?
	How much of a difference do you expect this mission to make in the short run?	What is the utility and role of different means?
	How much of a difference do you expect this mission to make in the short run?	What is the utility and role of different means?
Philosophical	The actions of Country B (the attacker) are... (Morally Right...Morally Wrong)	What is the essential nature of political life?
	Helping Country A (the country that was attacked in the situation) would be... (Highly Immoral...Highly Moral)	How much control of historical development does an individual have?
	When considering the costs of any military action, how important are human costs (casualties)?	What is the essential nature of political life?
	Considering the situation, how would you feel toward Country A (the country that was attacked) before any American involvement?	How much control of historical development does an individual have?
Political Ideology Ideology	The United States should focus on itself and reduce its involvement with other countries.	
	The United States has a responsibility to shape the international environment and to engage with other countries.	

3.5 Modeling the Relationship Between the Situation and a Personal Belief Set

Exploring the relationship between the situation and a personal belief set required the use of several models. The first model addressed the direct influence of situation factors on public support.

$$\begin{aligned} Support =& \beta_1 ActionType + \beta_2 Friend + \beta_3 Sympathy + \beta_4 ActionType \times Friend \\ &+ \beta_5 ActionType \times Sympathy + \beta_6 Friend \times Sympathy \\ &+ \beta_7 ActionType \times Friend \times Sympathy + \beta_8 Constant + \epsilon \end{aligned}$$

The Situation model assessed whether the experimental factors or any of their interactions influenced the level of support for the response to the crisis in the scenario. Each variable was categorical as the section on the experimental factors discussed.

The Personal Belief Set model assessed whether the operational code belief and ideological worldview variables had direct influence on public support. It also included a measure of personal politics. $Polspec$ measured where on a spectrum from "Staunchly Liberal" to "Staunchly Conservative" a participant reported him or her self[6, 7].

$$\begin{aligned} Support =& \beta_1 Instrumental + \beta_2 Philosophical + \beta_3 Worldview + \\ &+ \beta_4 Polspec + \beta_5 Constant + \epsilon \end{aligned}$$

[6] Demographic variables including sex, age, income, education, and military participation were not significant.

[7] An attempt to include $Polspec$ in the factor analysis resulted in it loading on its own factor. It did not load onto $Wordlview$.

Finally, the Full model combined the Situation and Personal Belief Set models.

$$\begin{aligned} Support =& \beta_1 ActionType + \beta_2 Friend + \beta_3 Sympathy + \beta_4 Instrumental \\ &+ \beta_5 Philosophical + \beta_6 Worldview + \beta_7 Polspec + \beta_8 ActionType \times Friend \\ &+ \beta_9 ActionType \times Sympathy + \beta_{10} Friend \times Sympathy \\ &+ \beta_{11} ActionType \times Friend \times Sympathy + \beta_{12} Constant + \epsilon \end{aligned}$$

This model allowed an exploration of how the Personal Beliefs Set variables altered the influence of the situation factors.

3.6 Results

The purpose of the experiment was to determine if the experiment factors influenced the support decision. Figure 3.2 presents the mean, standard deviation, and number of participants for each scenario and Figure 3.3 provides the same information for the experiment factors. Type III ANOVA analysis was appropriate for examining the Situation model. Type III ANOVA calculates the sum of squares for each factor given the levels of other factors and all interactions. It is appropriate when the data are unbalanced or when an interaction is significant. Both conditions apply in the Situation model. All of the analyses used Helmert contrasts for the factor variables. Helmert contrasts are appropriate to create orthogonal factors from unbalanced data. Consequently, the Helmert contrast was proper for the analyses. As Table 3.3 shows, the results of an ANOVA on the Situation model indicated both the relationship between the United States and the country receiving assistance and the level of the sympathy factor as well as the interaction between those factors were relevant to the support level decision at a $p = 0.01$ significance level. The type of action, combat or noncombat, was not significant on its own, but was part of a significant three-way interaction between the factors. Figure 3.4 shows the effects of the factors on $Support$ graphically.

	Combat		Noncombat	
	Low Sympathy	High Sympathy	Low Sympathy	High Sympathy
Friendly Relations	Mean = 6.88 Std Dev = 2.86 n = 147	Mean = 7.77 Std Dev = 2.61 n = 154	Mean = 7.29 Std Dev = 2.70 n = 152	Mean = 8.06 Std Dev = 2.54 n = 154
Challenging Relations	Mean = 5.37 Std Dev = 2.92 n = 150	Mean = 6.67 Std Dev = 2.78 n = 156	Mean = 4.86 Std Dev = 2.92 n = 150	Mean = 7.09 Std Dev = 2.78 n = 152

Figure 3.2: Support Scores by Scenario

	Friend		*Sympathy*		*ActionType*	
	Low	High	Low	High	Combat	Noncombat
Support (Std Dev) n	6.01 (2.98) 608	7.51 (2.71) 607	6.10 (3.02) 599	7.40 (2.73) 616	6.68 (2.91) 607	6.83 (2.98) 608

Figure 3.3: Support Scores by Factor and Level

Table 3.4: Experiment 2 ANOVA

	Dependent variable:			
	Support			
	Sum Sq	Df	F value	Pr(>F)
$ActionType$	7	1	0.9047	0.341722
$Friend$	686	1	89.8306	$< 2.2e-16^{***}$
$Sympathy$	512	1	67.0818	$6.574e-16^{***}$
$ActionType \times Friend$	12	1	1.5579	0.212213
$ActionType \times Sympathy$	12	1	1.5621	0.211606
$Friend \times Sympathy$	66	1	8.6678	0.003301^{***}
$ActionType \times Friend \times Sympathy$	21	1	2.7149	0.099675^{*}
(Intercept)	55307	1	7240.5964	$< 2.2e-16^{***}$
Residuals	9920	1207		
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01



Figure 3.4: Effects of Factors on $Support$

The ANOVA results indicated which factors were influential, but regression analysis can provide further insight into the influence of the factors and of the other model elements the survey captured. The results of regression analysis on all four models are in Table 3.4.

Table 3.5: Model Results

	Dependent variable:		
		Support	
	Situation	Personal Belief Set	Full
$ActionType$	-0.075		-0.202^{***}
	(0.079)		(0.053)
$Friend$	0.752^{***}		0.224^{***}
	(0.079)		(0.055)
$Sympathy$	0.650^{***}		0.157^{***}
	(0.079)		(0.055)
$Instrumental$		1.732^{***}	1.671^{***}
		(0.054)	(0.057)
$Philosophical$		0.565^{***}	0.527^{***}
		(0.053)	(0.054)
$Worldview$		1.343^{***}	1.287^{***}
		(0.055)	(0.054)
$Polspec$		0.122^{***}	0.124^{***}
		(0.020)	(0.019)
$ActionType \times Friend$	-0.099		-0.081
	(0.079)		(0.053)
$ActionType \times Sympathy$	-0.099		-0.076
	(0.079)		(0.053)
$Friend \times Sympathy$	-0.233^{***}		-0.076
	(0.079)		(0.053)
$ActionType \times Friend$	0.131^{*}		0.080
$\times Sympathy$	(0.079)		(0.053)
$Constant$	6.748^{***}	6.094^{***}	6.078^{***}
	(0.079)	(0.119)	(0.118)
Observations	1,215	1,214	1,214
R^2	0.125	0.602	0.617
Adjusted R^2	0.120	0.601	0.614
Residual Std. Error	2.764 (df = 1207)	1.862 (df = 1209)	1.832 (df = 1202)
F Statistic	24.541^{***} (df = 7; 1207)	456.879^{***} (df = 4; 1209)	176.113^{***} (df = 11; 1202)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

3.7 Analysis of Results

The ANOVA and regression analysis on the Situation model provided strong evidence for *Hypothesis 1* and *Hypothesis 2*. In each case, the experimental factor was significant at the $p = 0.001$ level.[8] Consistent with theories about in-group behavior, friendly relations increased the level of support for a response to the crisis. The scenarios designed to generate more sympathy for the country in need of assistance also received more support. Evidence for *Hypothesis 3*, a preference for noncombat, did not exist in the Situation model.

With the absence of a significant main effect in the experiment for the contrast of combat and noncombat, it was necessary to confirm the participants understood the difference between the combat and noncombat scenarios. Three separate manipulation checks built into the survey confirmed the participants understood the difference. The manipulation check questions asked if the United States' response to the situation was mostly combat or mostly noncombat, if the United States deployed forces to fight war along side the other country, and if the United States deployed forces to train and support the other country's military. In each case, a difference of means test significant at the $p = 0.001$ level indicated the participants understood the difference between combat and noncombat scenarios. The participants understood the difference and still gave similar support to both combat and noncombat responses to the crisis.

As the ANOVA indicated, and Figure 3.5 shows, regression analyses on the Situation model confirmed both the significance and directionality of the influence of the $Friend$ and $Sympathy$ factors as being consistent with expectations. Friendly relations and a more sympathetic scenario increased support. Figure 3.6, a pull out of part of Figure 3.4, provides insight into the significant interaction between $Friend$ and $Sympathy$. While the interaction coefficient is negative, the most appropriate interpretation of the result was that a sympathetic scenario motivated a larger

[8] Removing the interactions from the model had no relevant influence on the main effects of any experiment factor in any model.

increase in support for a country with a challenging relationship with the United States than the same scenario did for a friend. The result may be the result of the effect of the friendly country being part of the in-group. $Sympathy$ had less capacity to increase public support support for a friend because the public would support a friend more regardless of the scenario, as figure 3.6 demonstrates.



Figure 3.5: Situation Model Coefficients with 95% Confidence Intervals



Figure 3.6: Relative influence of $Friend$ and $Sympathy$ on Public Support

The results on the Personal Belief Set model provided strong evidence for *Hypothesis 4*. Each of the variables showed direct influence on public support. Figure 3.7 provides the coefficients. The pragmatic element associated with instrumental operational code beliefs was more influential than the normative philosophical operational code belief-related variable. This result was consistent with the expectations of the Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) framework. The political and ideological worldview variable also had influence. $Polspec$ measured where on a spectrum from "Staunchly Liberal" to "Staunchly Conservative" a participant reported him or her self[9, 10].

[9]Demographic variables including sex, age, income, education, and military participation were not significant.

[10]An attempt to include $Polspec$ in the factor analysis resulted in it loading on its own factor. It did not load onto $Wordlview$.



Figure 3.7: Personal Belief Set Model Coefficients with 95% Confidence Intervals

The factor analysis weighting scheme for $Instrumental$ and $Philosophical$ from Table 3.2 provided sufficient guidance to allow useful interpretation. Participants who considered the action in the scenario justified, thought the action would be successful in generating benefit for the United States or as making a difference lent more support to the response. The significance and directionality of the normative, philosophical operational code belief-related, variable indicated lower human costs, stronger moral justification and feeling worse for the country of interest increased public support for the response in the scenario. Less isolationist or increased internationalist perspective on political ideology increased public support for the response. Finally, the political spectrum interpretation was simple. As the participant became more politically conservative, support for the response increased.

The Full model provided the ability to assess how the inclusion of the Personal Belief Set model variables altered the influence of the experimental factors from the baselines set in the Situation model. Four key aspects of the Full model results required explanation: the emergence of the significance of the response policy choice, the reduction in the magnitude of the coefficients for

$Friend$ and $Sympathy$, and the character of the experiment factors retaining influence despite the inclusion of related operational code belief and ideological worldview elements in the model. Figure 3.7 shows the contingent influence of the factors.[11]



Figure 3.8: Full Model Coefficients with 95% Confidence Intervals

The coefficient for $ActionType$ changed from -0.07543 to -0.20205 and became significant at the $p = 0.001$ level. The significant difference in public support between a combat and a noncombat response was the result of the instrumental operational code belief variable, $Instrumental$. Once the model controlled for the participant's effectiveness expectations, the moral preference for noncombat emerged[12]. The preference existed despite the model controlling for normative preferences through the $Philosophical$ variable.

[11]Removing the interactions from the model has negligible effects on the coefficients in the model. They remain in the model for consistency.

[12]Removing $Instrumental$ from the model returns $ActionType$ to insignificance.

The reduction in the coefficient for $Friend$ from 0.75162 to 0.22441 implied the operational code belief and $Worldview$ variables mitigated the influence of the relationship, but the in-group preference remained. The same is true for $Sympathy$. The coefficient declined from 0.64951 to 0.15657 indicating the the egregiousness of the situation held influence beyond the moral and practical implications.

The final aspect to explore was the character of the situation factors remaining influential. Each of the experiment factors dealt with normative concerns. Preference for noncombat, value in friendship, and sympathy for another are each value-based choices. They were significant in the Full model despite the inclusion of the operational code belief variables. In fact, the inclusion of operational code beliefs exposed the underlying moral preference for noncombat. These results provide strong evidence for *Hypothesis 5*. The situational factors remaining significant after including operational code belief variables were values based, not pragmatic.

3.7.1 Mediation Analysis

One challenge of this research was assessing the directionality of the relationship between the situation and the personal beliefs. It is possible the beliefs shaped the interpretation of the situation. It is also possible the situation activated beliefs associated with it. This reality was why the arrow between them in the conceptual model was dual headed. For this experiment, the participants viewed the situation before being asked values-related questions. The arrow traveled from the situation to the belief set. Mediation analysis was necessary to determine how much effect on the influence of the situation factors the beliefs variables had.

The analysis required two steps as Imai, Keele and Yamamoto (2010) described. The first step was to determine if any of the situation factors predicted the values of the belief variables. Accomplishing this step required performing a regression using the belief variable as the dependent variable and the Full model, excluding the belief variable of interest, as the explanatory model.

Analyses of the following equations determined the experiment factors predicted the beliefs. Consequently, assessment of the direct and causal mediation effects was necessary.

$$\begin{aligned} Instrumental =& \beta_1 ActionType + \beta_2 Friend + \beta_3 Sympathy + \beta_4 Philosophical \\ &+ \beta_5 Worldview + \beta_6 Polspec + \beta_7 ActionType \times Friend \\ &+ \beta_8 ActionType \times Sympathy + \beta_9 Friend \times Sympathy \\ &+ \beta_{10} ActionType \times Friend \times Sympathy + \beta_{11} Constant + \epsilon \end{aligned} \tag{3.1}$$

$$\begin{aligned} Philosophical =& \beta_1 ActionType + \beta_2 Friend + \beta_3 Sympathy + \beta_4 Instrumental \\ &+ \beta_5 Worldview + \beta_6 Polspec + \beta_7 ActionType \times Friend \\ &+ \beta_8 ActionType \times Sympathy + \beta_9 Friend \times Sympathy \\ &+ \beta_{10} ActionType \times Friend \times Sympathy + \beta_{11} Constant + \epsilon \end{aligned} \tag{3.2}$$

The results in Table 3.6 indicated all three experiment factors predicted $Instrumrntal$ and $Sympathy$ predicted $Philosophical$. These results required continuation onto the second step, determining the Average Causal Mediation Effect (ACME) using the methods in Tingley et al. (2014)[13].

[13]One observation did not include sufficient data for inclusion in the mediation analysis.

Table 3.6: Mediation Step 1

	Dependent variable:	
	$Instrumental$	$Philosophical$
	(1)	(2)
$ActionType$	0.132^{***}	-0.034
	(0.027)	(0.028)
$Friend$	0.263^{***}	0.0001
	(0.027)	(0.029)
$Sympathy$	0.157^{***}	0.221^{***}
	(0.028)	(0.029)
$Philosophical$	-0.021	
	(0.028)	
$Instrumental$		-0.023
		(0.030)
$WorldView$	-0.0003	-0.027
	(0.028)	(0.029)
$Polspec$	0.055^{***}	-0.015
	(0.010)	(0.010)
$ActionType \times Friend$	0.002	0.015
	(0.027)	(0.028)
$ActionType \times Sympathy$	0.006	-0.040
	(0.027)	(0.028)
$Friend \times Sympathy$	-0.054^{**}	0.008
	(0.027)	(0.028)
$ActionType \times Friend \times Sympathy$	0.018	-0.030
	(0.027)	(0.028)
$Constant$	-0.303^{***}	0.080
	(0.059)	(0.063)
Observations	1,214	1,214
R^2	0.137	0.053
Adjusted R^2	0.130	0.045
Residual Std. Error (df = 1203)	0.933	0.978
F Statistic (df = 10; 1203)	19.050^{***}	6.688^{***}
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The mediation calculations leveraged 1000 simulations to estimate the ACME using a bootstrapping technique. The results in Table 3.7 show $Instrumental$ mediated each of the experiment factors. While $Friend$ and $Sympathy$ maintained more than 30% of their influence on public support as direct influence despite mediation, $Instrumental$ fully mediated $ActionType$. Finding the direct effect of $ActionType$ significant, however, meant a preference existed when holding $Instrumental$ constant; the same result as in the Full model regression analysis. The examination of the mediation effects of $Philosophical$ showed it mediated $Sympathy$, but $Sympathy$ also maintained significant direct influence.

Table 3.7: Mediation Calculation

	Estimate	95% Confidence Interval	$p-value$
Mediation by $Instrumental$			
$ActionType$			
Ave. Causal Mediation Effect	0.441	0.250-0.61	<2e-16***
Ave. Direct Effect	-0.406	-0.611-(-0.20)	<2e-16***
Total Effect	0.035	-0.243-0.32	0.8
Proportion Mediated	12.605	-45.846-51.89	0.8
$Friend$			
Ave. Causal Mediation Effect	0.878	0.703-1.06	<2e-16***
Ave. Direct Effect	0.448	0.227-0.66	<2e-16***
Total Effect	1.326	1.042-1.60	<2e-16***
Proportion Mediated	0.662	0.554-0.81	<2e-16***
$Sympathy$			
Ave. Causal Mediation Effect	0.525	0.325-0.73	<2e-16***
Ave. Direct Effect	0.312	0.117-0.54	<2e-16***
Total Effect	0.837	0.533-1.14	<2e-16***
Proportion Mediated	0.627	0.461-0.83	<2e-16***
Mediation by $Philosophical$			
$Sympathy$			
Ave. Causal Mediation Effect	0.2330	0.1557-0.32	<2e-16***
Ave. Direct Effect	0.3123	0.0999-0.54	0.002***
Total Effect	0.5454	0.3345-0.77	<2e-16***
Proportion Mediated	0.4273	0.2628-0.71	<2e-16***
Note:	*p<0.05;	**p<0.01;	***p<0.001

3.8 Experiment 2 Conclusion

Experiment 2 provided several insights. First, the public prefers noncombat over combat when its preference process includes instrumental and philosophical operational code beliefs (*Hypothesis 3*). Second, differences in the situation of an international crisis matter to generating public support. The public will provide greater support for those with whom the United States has a friendly relationship (*Hypothesis 1*) and for those whose situation generates sympathy (*Hypothesis 2*).

Experiment 2 also demonstrated the value of operational code beliefs for influencing public support (*Hypothesis 4*). Finally, it demonstrated that situation factors retain influence despite the inclusion of operational code beliefs when they relate to important values; combat is undesirable, friendship matters, and sympathy motivates (*Hypothesis 5*).

Finally, the factors important to determining public support for noncombat were essentially the same as for combat in this experiment. The participants preferred noncombat when incorporating operational code beliefs in preference formation, but the other elements driving the level of support were similar for both policies.

4.1 Experiment on the Influence of Noncombat Operation Characteristics on Public Support

The third experiment explored how different characteristics of a military noncombat operation influenced public support for it. Studies on both foreign aid and combat operations found public support levels depend on a complex combination of factors. Foreign aid literature indicated practical concerns had influence on the public support of aid. Factors from the strategic importance of the aid recipient to the income of the donors influenced the types and levels of aid offered as well as the public support for it (Milner and Tingley (2013); Fink and Redaelli (2011); Otter (2003); Paxton and Knack (2012)). In conflict literature, one practical concern critical to the public's support of combat missions was cost. Some studies found the public evaluates the costs in terms of casualties (Gartner and Segura (1998); Eichenberg (2005)). Other studies found the costs related to financial burdens were relevant, particularly for debt funding (Flores-Macías and Kreps (2015)). It is possible the public did not undergo a complex cost analysis when determining its support (Berinsky (2007)) or they do not differentiate between human and financial costs, although they still consider costs generally important in determining support (**?**). Finally, some scholars argued costs, particularly casualty costs, lose relevance when compared to the expectation of success (Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009)). Costs are therefore important practical considerations for evaluating the support the public grants a military action.

The characteristics of the actors involved may also influence public support for military noncombat operations. Chong and Gradstein (2008) and Paxton and Knack (2012) found attitudes toward recipients (the other), a perception of the inefficiency of one's own government (the primary actor), and political spectrum position (one's self) influenced public support for foreign aid. Such attitudes toward the recipient of assistance could manifest in support for military noncombat

operations. It is possible the public would consider military-to-military relationships as the only acceptable role for the U.S. military's interaction with the recipient country. The public may view aiding civilian elements as being outside the military's purview. The public may deem such missions more appropriate for other governmental elements such as the Department of State or the U.S. Agency for International Development. Concerns regarding the militarization of the relationship the United States has with foreign civilian governments may also influence support (Krahenbuhl et al. (2011); *SCHR Position Paper on Humanitarian-Military Relations* (2010)).

In foreign aid literature, one consistent influential factor is the moral justification for the aid. A perception of aid's need as well as feelings of altruism or generosity toward the recipient increased public support for foreign aid (Mosley (1985); Otter (2003); Fink and Redaelli (2011); Paxton and Knack (2012)). The morality of the purpose for military combat operations also influenced public support. Several scholars found the "principal policy objective (PPO)" of a mission to be one of the vital factors for determining public support for combat operations. Public support was significantly lower when the PPO was to initiate an internal change of the foreign nation's regime, an act seen as aggressive, than it was for objectives related to national security concerns, such as restraining a belligerent's aggressive foreign policy, or for humanitarian interventions (Jentleson (1992); Jentleson and Britton (1998); Oneal, Lian and Joyner (1996); Eichenberg (2005); Nincic (1997)). Given this background, it is possible the moral foundation for the noncombat operation will influence the support it receives from the public.

4.2 Experimental Design

This research used Experiment 3 to explore how situational factors influenced public support for military noncombat operations. The research used a 2x2x2 between-groups factorial experimental design to manipulate the purpose of the operation as a measure of morality, the characteristics of the recipients, and the cost of the operation. Each participant received one of eight treatments after random assignment to it.

	National Security		Humanitarian	
	High Cost	Low Cost	High Cost	Low Cost
Civil Development	Scenario 3	Scenario 4	Scenario 5	Scenario 8
Military Development	Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Scenario 6	Scenario 7

Figure 4.1: Influences on Support of Noncombat Operations

4.3 Experiment Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: Noncombat operations with a humanitarian purpose will garner more support than those with a national security interest.

The logic of the Sacred Values Protection Model as Tetlock et al. (2000) described applied to this hypothesis. Humanitarian purpose will provide the opportunity to protect what is normatively considered infinitely valuable, lives. Such a purpose also more popular than other more aggressive foreign policy purposes according to the PPO concept of Jentleson (1992).

Hypothesis 2: Noncombat operations providing benefit to foreign military recipients will generate more support than those providing assistance to foreign civilian recipients.

Paxton and Knack (2012) found differences in attitudes toward the recipients generated different level of support for foreign aid. While their research focused on attitudes about perceptions of the recipient's ability to help themselves, the underlying idea related to perceptions about the characteristics of the recipient having influence.

Hypothesis 3: High cost noncombat operations will generate less support than low cost operations.

Participants should behave consistently with rational choice logic.

Hypothesis 4: Elements reflective of pragmatic instrumental operational code beliefs will have influence on public support.[1]

Hypothesis 5: In a combined model, operational code beliefs will alter the influence of the situation factors, but situation factors related to important values will retain direct influence.

4.4 Data Generation

4.4.1 Participants

MTurk[2] provided 814 unique completed survey responses[3]. The following analysis included all survey responses, including low quality responses[4]. Participant demographics differed from those of the U.S. population. Survey participants included significantly fewer women and were slightly younger than the broader population. They also identified themselves as an Independent or a Democrat at a higher rate and Republican at a lower rate than the population.

[1]The section on Parsing Operational Code Beliefs in this chapter will address which variables relate to instrumental operational code beliefs and which relate to philosophical operational code beliefs.

[2]See the discussion of MTurk in the Research Plan.

[3]A software-related data collection problem caused Scenario 6 to have fewer responses than expected from the random assignment process. The random assignment process functioned properly for all scenarios, but for a short period of time respondents assigned to Scenario 6 could not complete the survey for recorded results.

[4]Examples of low quality responses included 123 participants who took less than three minutes to complete the entire survey process and a small number who produced responses with very little variance in their values, for example every response was an "8". Each scenario had similar numbers of low quality responses. Scenario 6 had fewer low quality responses, a result consistent with the lower number of total surveys. Retaining these responses in the analysis increased the error associated with the results and thus strengthened the evidence for any significant findings.

Table 4.1: Participant and U.S. Population Demographics

Characteristic	Participant	Population
Median Age	31-35 range	37.9 years
Percent Female	37.9%	50.8%
Median Income	$50-62K range	57,617
Democrat/Indep/Republican	34/49/17%	27/42/28%

All population data except political affiliation are from the U.S. Census Bureau for 2016.
Political affiliation data are from Gallup poll responses contemporaneous with the researcher's survey.

4.4.2 Experimental Factors

4.4.2.1 Situation

Each treatment presented the participant with a situation wherein a country facing a crisis requested assistance from the United States. In response, the United States chose to send military forces to conduct noncombat efforts to provide the assistance. The treatments varied the purpose of the mission, the group receiving assistance, and the cost of providing assistance.

4.4.2.2 $Humanitarian$

To vary the purpose of the operation as either humanitarian or for national security, the treatments included one of two statements:

1. The United States has a long-term interest in the success of a foreign government. The target country's location is of strategic importance. The position allows it to ensure trade routes critical to the U.S. economy remain open. Loss of control of the trade routes could result in a dire economic decline in the U.S. economy. The target country is also the only source of a mineral used for US national defense. Loss of cooperation between the countries could

leave the United States without access to the strategic resource.

The target country is under threat from an insurgency with ties to attacks on western interests. The intent of the insurgency is to overthrow and replace the current government. If the insurgency takes control, experts do not expect a humanitarian crisis, but they do believe the target country will become a base for exporting violence against the United States and other western countries.

2. A severe natural disaster struck a foreign country, killing more than 10,000 people in less than twenty-four hours. Without massive international assistance, experts estimate 50,000 more people will die in the next week and more than 100,000 people will die before the situation stabilizes.

4.4.2.3 $HighCost$

To experimentally manipulate costs, the research contrasted a scenario with both high human (casualties) and financial costs relative to having the military force remain at its home station with one wherein the costs were similar to those of remaining at the home station[5]:

1. The financial cost of the deployment is nearly identical to the cost of training the U.S. force without deploying them because the target country will provide support, within its capabilities, to the U.S. military operation. U.S. military and political leaders are happy with the target country's level of support.

   The U.S. military does not expect deaths or injuries beyond the accidental levels expected

[5]The use of the novel relative measure of costs to those of remaining at the home station provided three key benefits. First, it avoided the introduction of ambiguity related to absolute measures of cost. People often find comprehending large numbers, such as the costs of conflict, very difficult (Landy, Silbert and Goldin (2013); Barrio, Goldstein and Hofman (2016)). Use of the relative measure negated the need to use difficult-to-grasp numbers. Second, it provided some perspective for determining if the cost should be considered high or low. Without a reference, someone may consider an operation high cost if told its expenses were $10 million. If the participant was unaware the alternative cost $100 million, he or she would not recognize the former as the low cost option. Finally, it provided an easily accessible benchmark from which the participants could assess deviation. The benefits of the relative metric remain when human costs are the measures.

during peacetime operations at a home station because the forces are deploying into a cooperative environment.

2. The process of deploying the force into a foreign country and executing the mission there imparts significant costs on the American people. U.S. military leaders expect the training in the target country to be many times more expensive than training at a home station. As well, training the military of the target country reduces the opportunity for the U.S. forces to improve their own capabilities.

   Finally, having U.S. forces train the target country's military significantly increases risks for the U.S. force. U.S. military and political leaders expect deaths and injuries to occur during the operation. Leaders expect the numbers of dead and injured to be much higher than would exist if the U.S. military remained at its home station.

4.4.2.4 $MilRecipient$

Finally, the experiment varied the recipients of assistance. Participants received a treatment indicating development of civilian capabilities or military capabilities:

1. The target country needs to rebuild its civilian infrastructure and governance capabilities. The political leadership of the target country requested, and U.S. leaders intend to send, a large U.S. military force into the country to conduct a wide-ranging effort to improve the capabilities of the target nation's hospitals, transportation networks, and law enforcement practices. The U.S. military has the ability to assist the target country in each of these areas. Leaders of both the target country and the United States want this deployment to improve capabilities and relations.

   The U.S. force will not be working with the target nation's military, nor will it engage in any combat operations during the deployment.

2. The political leadership of the target country requested, and U.S. leaders intend to send, a large U.S. military force into the country to conduct a noncombat mission to improve the military capabilities of the target country. The missions include exchanges of ideas and training concepts at all levels from junior military members to senior leaders.

   The U.S. force will not engage in any combat operations during the deployment. Leaders of both the target country and the United States want this deployment to improve capabilities and relations.

4.4.3 Parsing Operational Code Beliefs

In addition to the experimental factors, the survey asked several additional questions. The questions explored the participant's personal belief set. Some of the questions addressed the expected success level for the mission, and the short- and long-term difference in the situation the action will make. Other questions addressed the importance of human costs, financial costs, and demographics.

A principal component factor analysis on several of these variables generated two identifiable latent concepts. The rotated factor weights are in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Factor Analysis Rotated Weights

Variable	$Instrumental_1$	$Instrumental_2$
Expected level of success for the mission	**0.8578**	-0.0556
Difference the mission makes in the short run	**0.7418**	-0.0880
Difference the mission makes in the long run	**0.8424**	-0.0123
Acceptability of using the military for noncombat operations	**0.7579**	-0.0004
Military capability to execute a broad range of operations	**0.7815**	0.1196
Effects of human costs for this mission	0.1071	**0.8430**
Effects of monetary costs for this mission	-0.1301	**0.8317**
Eigen Value	3.20922	1.42773

The survey data for this experiment focused on the influence of practical elements on public support. As a result, the personal belief set variables separated into factors corresponding to two different instrumental operational code beliefs. $Instrumental_1$ weighted questions related to instrumental operational code beliefs about the effectiveness of the action. The first variable, $expsucc$ was the response to the question, "How likely to be successful do you think this mission will be?" A score of zero indicated "Unsuccessful" while a 10 indicated "Successful." The $msnsrt$ variable was the score the participant gave in response to the question "How much of a difference do you expect this mission to make in the short run?" Similarly, the $msnlng$ variable was the response to "How much of a difference do you expect this mission to make in the long run?" The variable $ncbtuse$ recorded the level of agreement with the statement, "The United States should use its military in non-combat environments to pursue national interests." A zero score indicated "Completely Disagree" while "Completely Agree resulted in a score of 10. Finally, $broadmil$ measured agreement with the statement, "The US military can achieve success conducting missions across a broad spectrum spanning from civilian capability development to warfighting." using the same scale. Table 4.3 shows the heavily weighted questions by operational code belief.

Table 4.3: Operational Code Belief by Heavily Weighted Questions

Factor Result	Survey Questions	Related Questions from George (1969)
$Instrumental_1$	How likely to be successful do you think this mission will be?	How are goals pursued most effectively?
	How much of a difference do you expect this mission to make in the short run?	What is the utility and role of different means?
	How much of a difference do you expect this mission to make in the short run?	What is the utility and role of different means?
	The United States should use its military in non-combat environments to pursue national interests.	What is the utility and role of different means?
	The US military can achieve success conducting missions across a broad spectrum spanning from civilian capability development to warfighting.	How are goals pursued most effectively?
$Instrumental_2$	When thinking of the costs of the mission, how important to you is risk of injury or death in the way you determine cost?	How are risks calculated/controlled/ accepted for political action?
	When thinking of the costs of the mission, how important to you is the financial element of cost?	How are risks calculated/controlled/ accepted for political action?

The second factor was a straight forward measure of costs. The first variable, $death$[6], recorded the responses to the question, "When thinking of the costs of the mission, how important to you is risk of injury or death in the way you determine cost?" Answering "Not Important" resulted in a zero score scaling up to 10 with a response of "Highly Important." The question "When thinking of the costs of the mission, how important to you is the financial element of cost?" produced the variable $finance$ using the same scale.

[6]It is important to recognize the $anyhum$ measure in Experiments 1 and 2 asked a philosophical question about the importance of human costs generally, a measure of the participant's values. The mission-specific nature of this question makes it a pure cost measure rather then a value measure. As well, the latent concept unveiled by this factor analysis was exclusively about measurable costs while the factor loading of $death$ in the previous experiments linked to questions about morality, helping, and how the participant felt.

4.5 Modeling the Relationship Between the Situation and a Personal Belief Set

Exploring the relationship between the situation and a personal belief set required the use of several models. The first model addressed the direct influence of situation factors on public support.

$$\begin{aligned} Support =& \beta_1 Humanitarian + \beta_2 MilRecipient + \beta_3 HighCost + \beta_4 Humanitarian \times MilRecipient \\ &+ \beta_5 Humanitarian \times HighCost + \beta_6 MilRecipient \times HighCost \\ &+ \beta_7 Humanitarian \times MilRecipient \times HighCost + \beta_8 Constant + \epsilon \end{aligned}$$

The Situation model assessed whether the experimental factors or any of their interactions influenced the level of support for the response to the crisis in the scenario. Each variable was categorical as the section on the experimental factors discussed.

The Personal Belief Set model assessed whether the operational code belief variables had direct influence on public support.

$$Support = \beta_1 Instrumental_1 + \beta_2 Instrumental_2 + \beta_3 Constant + \epsilon$$

Finally, the Full model combined the Situation and Personal Belief Set models.

$$\begin{aligned} Support =& \beta_1 Humanitarian + \beta_2 MilRecipient + \beta_3 HighCost + \beta_4 Instrumental_1 + \beta_5 Instrumental_2 \\ &+ \beta_6 Humanitarian \times MilRecipient + \beta_7 Humanitarian \times HighCost \\ &+ \beta_8 MilRecipient \times HighCost + \beta_9 Humanitarian \times MilRecipient \times HighCost \\ &+ \beta_{10} Constant + \epsilon \end{aligned}$$

This model allowed an exploration of how the Personal Beliefs Set variables altered the influence of the situation factors[7].

[7]Demographic variables including sex, age, income, and military participation were not significant in any model. Similarly, the participant's position on a spectrum from "Staunchly Liberal" to "Staunchly Conservative" was not

4.6 Results

The purpose of the experiment was to determine if the experiment factors influenced the support for noncombat operations. Figure 4.2 presents the mean, standard deviation, and number of participants for each scenario and Figure 4.3 presents the same information by experiment factor. Type III ANOVA analysis was appropriate for examining the Situation model. Type III ANOVA calculates the sum of squares for each factor given the levels of other factors and all interactions. It is appropriate when the data are unbalanced, as is the case for this experiment. All of the analyses used Helmert contrasts for the factor variables. Helmert contrasts are appropriate to create orthogonal factors from unbalanced data. Consequently, the Helmert contrast was proper for the analyses. Table 4.3 shows the results of the ANOVA on the Situation model indicate all three factors influenced public support. Figure 4.4 depicts the effects of the factors on $Support$ graphically.

	National Security		Humanitarian	
	High Cost	Low Cost	High Cost	Low Cost
Civilian Development	Mean = 5.35 Std Dev = 2.69 n = 108	Mean = 6.81 Std Dev = 2.69 n = 97	Mean = 5.90 Std Dev = 2.78 n = 109	Mean = 7.75 Std Dev = 2.48 n = 110
Military Development	Mean = 5.27 Std Dev = 2.72 n = 106	Mean = 7.36 Std Dev = 2.14 n = 105	Mean = 6.78 Std Dev = 2.01 n = 76	Mean = 8.00 Std Dev = 2.43 n = 103

Figure 4.2: Support Scores by Scenario

significant.

	Purpose		*Recipient*		*Cost*	
	National Security	Humanitarian	Civilian	Military	Low	High
Support (Std Dev) n	6.18 (2.72) 416	7.12 (2.61) 398	6.45 (2.81) 424	6.85 (2.58) 390	7.50 (2.47) 415	5.75 (2.66) 399

Figure 4.3: Support Scores by Factor and Level

Table 4.4: Experiment 3 ANOVA

	Dependent variable:			
	Support			
	Sum Sq	Df	F value	Pr(>F)
$Humanitarian$	165	1	25.9631	$4.338e-07^{***}$
$HighCost$	552	1	86.6993	$< 2.2e-16^{***}$
$MilRecipient$	32	1	4.9982	0.02565^{**}
$Humanitarian \times MilRecipient$	5	1	0.8423	0.35902
$Humanitarian \times HighCost$	3	1	0.4389	0.50782
$MilRecipient \times HighCost$	0	1	0.0001	0.99323
$Humanitarian \times MilRecipient \times HighCost$	20	1	3.1190	0.07776^{*}
(Intercept)	35572	1	5588.8573	$< 2.2e-16^{***}$
Residuals	5130	806		

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01







Figure 4.4: Effects of Factors on $Support$

The ANOVA results indicated the factors were influential, but regression analysis can provide further insight into the influence of the factors and of the other model elements the survey captured. The results of regression analysis on all four models are in Table 4.4.

Table 4.5: Experiment 3 Model Regression Results

	Dependent variable:		
	Support		
	Situation	Personal Belief Set	Full
$Humanitarian$	0.454^{***}		0.040
	(0.089)		(0.065)
$MilRecipient$	0.199^{**}		0.125^{**}
	(0.089)		(0.063)
$HighCost$	-0.829^{***}		-0.519^{***}
	(0.089)		(0.065)
$Instrumental_1$		1.979^{***}	1.880^{***}
		(0.066)	(0.065)
$Instrumental_2$		-0.284^{***}	-0.202^{***}
		(0.066)	(0.065)
$Humanitarian \times MilRecipient$	0.082		0.054
	(0.089)		(0.064)
$Humanitarian \times HighCost$	0.059		-0.016
	(0.089)		(0.064)
$MilRecipient \times HighCost$	0.001		0.002
	(0.089)		(0.064)
$Humanitarian \times MilRecipient$	0.157^{*}		0.098
$\times HighCost$	(0.089)		(0.063)
$Constant$	6.654^{***}	6.633^{***}	6.632^{***}
	(0.089)	(0.066)	(0.063)
Observations	814	788	788
R^2	0.138	0.541	0.581
Adjusted R^2	0.131	0.540	0.577
Residual Std. Error	2.523 (df = 806)	1.842 (df = 785)	1.768 (df = 778)
F Statistic	18.476^{***} (df = 7; 806)	463.286^{***} (df = 2; 785)	120.110^{***} (df = 9; 778)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

4.7 Analysis of Results

The ANOVA and regression analysis on the Situation model provided strong evidence for *Hypotheses 1, 2,* and *3*. In the cases of $Humanitarian$ and $HighCost$, the experimental factors were significant at the $p = 0.001$ level. $MilRecipient$ was significant at the $p = 0.05$ level. These results indicated the participants preferred the humanitarian purpose to the national security purpose, preferred to develop the military of the country of interest over its civilian capabilities, and preferred the low cost actions.

Examining the regression analysis on the models provided more insights into the details of the experiment's findings. As the ANOVA indicated and Figure 4.5 depicts, the Situation model confirmed both the significance and directionality of the influence of the factors as being consistent with expectations. The inclusion of high costs had a negative influence roughly twice the size of the influence of a humanitarian purpose. Finally, working with the host country's military was only about half as influential as having a humanitarian purpose for the operation.



Figure 4.5: Situation Model Coefficients with 95% Confidence Intervals

The results on the Personal Belief Set model provided strong evidence for *Hypothesis 4*. Each of the variables showed direct influence on public support. Figure 4.6 provides the coefficients. The magnitude of the coefficient for $Instrumental_1$ was statistically larger than that of $Instrumental_2$ at better than the $p = 0.001$ level. The instrumental operational code belief element related to the effectiveness of the operation had more influence than costs. This result was consistent with the expectations of the Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) framework.



Figure 4.6: Personal Belief Set Model Coefficients with 95% Confidence Intervals

The Full model provided the ability to assess how the inclusion of the Personal Belief Set model variables altered the influence of the experimental factors from the baselines set in the Situation model. Three key aspects of the Full model results required explanation: $HighCost$'s retention of significance, the loss of significance for the purpose of the noncombat operation, and reduction in coefficient magnitude for the preference for military recipients. Figure 4.7 shows the contingent influence of the factors.



Figure 4.7: Full Model Coefficients with 95% Confidence Intervals

The variable $HighCost$ retained significance in the Full model despite both human and financial costs being included in the instrumental operational code belief variables[8]. The result provided some evidence for *Hypothesis 5*. The retained influence and significance resulted from values about the general preference for lower costs regardless of the ability to specifically account for the elements of cost.

The loss of significance posed a challenge to *Hypothesis 5*. A humanitarian purpose should have retained influence as a values-based preference. The failure to retain influence indicated the participants considered the purpose irrelevant after taking instrumental operational code beliefs into account. In robustness checks, $Humanitarian$ retained influence after removing $Instrumental_1$, the instrumental operational code belief variable related to the effectiveness of the operation. Removing $Instrumental_2$, related to costs, did not cause a discernible change in the magnitude or insignificance of $Humanitarian$ when compared to the Full model. These results imply the par-

[8]In robustness checks, $HighCost$ retained influence even when including $death$ and $finance$ in the models directly.

ticipants were concerned with whether the operation worked to resolve the situation regardless of why it began.

The continued influence of $MilRecipient$ was consistent with both *Hypothesis 1* and *5*. The reduction in magnitude indicated some of the influence of $MilRecipient$ in the Situation model was the result of the participant's expectation military-to-military interaction would be more effective or less costly. It's retained influence indicated participants preferred a military recipient for values other than effectiveness and costs.

4.7.1 Mediation Analysis

One challenge of this research was assessing the directionality of the relationship between the situation and the personal beliefs. It is possible the beliefs shaped the interpretation of the situation. It is also possible the situation activated beliefs associated with it. This reality was why the arrow between them in the conceptual model was dual headed. For this experiment, the participants viewed the situation before being asked values-related questions. The arrow traveled from the situation to the belief set. Mediation analysis was necessary to determine how much effect on the influence of the situation factors the beliefs variables had.

The analysis required two steps as Imai, Keele and Yamamoto (2010) described. The first step was to determine if any of the situation factors predicted the values of the belief variables. Accomplishing this step required performing a regression using the belief variable as the dependent variable and the Full model, excluding the belief variable of interest, as the explanatory model. Analyses of the following equations determined the experiment factors predicted the beliefs. Consequently, assessment of the direct and causal mediation effects was necessary.

$$
\begin{aligned}
Instrumental_1 =& \beta_1 Humanitarian + \beta_2 MilRecipient + \beta_3 HighCost + \beta_4 Instrumental_2 \\
&+ \beta_5 Humanitarian \times MilRecipient + \beta_6 Humanitarian \times HighCost \\
&+ \beta_7 MilRecipient \times HighCost + \beta_8 Humanitarian \times MilRecipient \times HighCost \\
&+ \beta_9 Constant + \epsilon
\end{aligned}
\tag{4.1}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
Instrumental_2 =& \beta_1 Humanitarian + \beta_2 MilRecipient + \beta_3 HighCost + \beta_4 Instrumental_1 \\
&+ \beta_5 Humanitarian \times MilRecipient + \beta_6 Humanitarian \times HighCost \\
&+ \beta_7 MilRecipient \times HighCost + \beta_8 Humanitarian \times MilRecipient \times HighCost \\
&+ \beta_9 Constant + \epsilon
\end{aligned}
\tag{4.2}
$$

The results in Table 4.6 indicated $Humanitarian$ and $HighCost$ predicted both $Instrumental_1$ and $Instrumental_2$. These results required continuation onto the second step, determining the Average Causal Mediation Effect (ACME) using the methods in Tingley et al. (2014).

Table 4.6: Mediation Step 1

$Humanitarian$	0.204^{***}	-0.137^{***}
	(0.035)	(0.036)
$MilRecipient$	0.036	-0.023
	(0.035)	(0.035)
$HighCost$	-0.159^{***}	0.120^{***}
	(0.035)	(0.036)
$Instrumental_2$	0.045	
	(0.035)	
$Instrumental_1$		0.046
		(0.036)
$Humanitarian \times MilRecipient$	0.010	-0.078^{**}
	(0.035)	(0.035)
$Humanitarian \times HighCost$	0.037	0.047
	(0.035)	(0.035)
$MilRecipient \times HighCost$	-0.009	-0.064^{*}
	(0.035)	(0.035)
$Humanitarian \times MilRecipient \times HighCost$	0.017	-0.049
	(0.035)	(0.035)
$Constant$	0.004	-0.008
	(0.035)	(0.035)
Observations	788	788
R^2	0.070	0.048
Adjusted R^2	0.061	0.038
Residual Std. Error (df = 779)	0.969	0.981
F Statistic (df = 8; 779)	7.358^{***}	4.859^{***}
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

The mediation calculations leveraged 1000 simulations to estimate the ACME using a bootstrapping technique. The results in Table 4.7 show $Instrumental_1$ mediated both $Humanitarian$ and $HighCost$. $Instrumental_1$ fully mediated $Humanitarian$,but only mediated 36.5% of the variance from $HighCost$. As a result, $HighCost$ maintained direct influence. $Instrumental_2$ mediated $Humanitarian$, but the mediation had no influence on the effect of $Humanitarian$ on public support. Finally, $Instrumental_2$ mediated $HighCost$, but the mediation altered the influence of $HighCost$ on public support by less than 5%.

Table 4.7: Mediation Calculation

	Estimate	95% Confidence Interval	$p-value$
Mediation by $Instrumental_1$			
$Humanitarian$			
Ave. Causal Mediation Effect	0.7576	0.4849-1.02	<2e-16***
Ave. Direct Effect	0.0658	-0.1896-0.31	0.69
Total Effect	0.8234	0.4567-1.19	<2e-16***
Proportion Mediated	0.9201	0.6892-1.33	<2e-16***
$HighCost$			
Ave. Causal Mediation Effect	-0.603	-0.861-(-0.34)	<2e-16***
Ave. Direct Effect	-1.048	-1.320-(-0.80)	<2e-16***
Total Effect	-1.651	-2.028-(-1.33)	<2e-16***
Proportion Mediated	0.365	0.240-0.48	<2e-16***
Mediation by $Instrumental_2$			
$Humanitarian$			
Ave. Causal Mediation Effect	0.0536	0.0148-0.11	0.004***
Ave. Direct Effect	0.0658	-0.1784-0.31	0.662
Total Effect	0.1193	-0.1259-0.37	0.398
Proportion Mediated	0.4489	-4.0010-4.05	0.398
$HighCost$			
Ave. Causal Mediation Effect	-0.0500	-0.0960-(-0.02)	<2e-16***
Ave. Direct Effect	-1.0479	-1.3051-(-0.76)	<2e-16***
Total Effect	-1.0979	-1.3531-(-0.82)	<2e-16***
Proportion Mediated	0.0456	0.0131-0.09	<2e-16***
Note:	*p<0.05;	**p<0.01;	***p<0.001

4.8 Experiment 3 Conclusion

Experiment 3 provided several insights. First, the public prefers lower costs even when its preference process includes instrumental operational code beliefs directly related to costs (*Hypothesis 3*). Second, differences in the situation of military noncombat operation matter to generating public support. The public will provide greater support for humanitarian purposes (*Hypothesis 1*) and for those providing development to foreign military capabilities (*Hypothesis 2*).

Experiment 3 also demonstrated the value of operational code beliefs for influencing public support (*Hypothesis 4*). Finally, it demonstrated that situation factors can retain influence despite the inclusion of operational code beliefs when they relate to important values (*Hypothesis 5*). Costs have influence as a concept beyond the measurable human and financial costs. The public also prefers military-to-military engagement over military-to-civilian engagement even after accounting for instrumental operational code beliefs related to effectiveness and costs. The participants did not retain a preference for humanitarian purposes for military noncombat operations. Further research is necessary to delve into why not.

5. CONCLUSION

5.1 Purpose

Political leaders in the United States have many policy options available to them when a crisis occurs. Two of those options involving the use of the military in response are combat operations and noncombat operations. Combat involves the use of violence to compel another to act in a desired fashion. Noncombat operations leverage the capabilities of the military to provide humanitarian assistance or to improve institutional capacity of a foreign country. A decision to use one or the other in response to a situation is a foreign policy choice.

Scholars have a long history of researching the factors influential in determining American foreign policy preferences. Different aspects of foreign policy had unique aspect-related factors, but one common factor was the need for public support. This research effort explored two questions. The first asked, "What factors influence the public support of U.S. military noncombat operations?" The second then asked, "Do the factors influencing support for U.S. military noncombat operations differ from those of combat operations?" From the results of the experiments, the answers to those questions were clear. First, both situational factors and personal belief sets influence public support for noncombat operations and, second, the factors related to support for military noncombat operations did not differ from those of combat.

5.2 Framework

The Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) framework provided an initial structure for considering the questions. Their framework, however, was generalizable to encompass a broader array of concepts. The generalized framework in Figure 5.1 allowed improved analysis of the factors going into determining public support.



Figure 5.1: Conceptual Model of the Influence of the Situation and a Personal Belief Set on Public Support. Adapted from Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009).

While Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) identified success expectation and the morality of acting as influential on casualty tolerance and subsequently on public support, those elements were examples of personal beliefs. The first fell into the category of instrumental operational code beliefs, those related to ends-means relationships, while the second fell into the category of philosophical operational code beliefs, those related to the fundamental nature of political things. Success expectation was important, but the ends-means relationship included more than just success. Using the instrumental operational code beliefs allowed a wider set of elements to coalesce into the belief influencing public support. Similarly, philosophical operational code beliefs include the morality of acting, but also included other concepts of political right and wrong.

5.3 Findings in the Research

This research used three experiments totaling more than 3,000 participants to explore factors influencing public support for different policy preferences. The experiments generated insights into the factors influencing public support for U.S. military noncombat operations and whether

they differ from those related to public support of combat operations. Across all three experiments the results indicated both the specifics of the situation and the respondent's beliefs influenced the level of support.

5.3.1 Situation Factors

In each experiment, situation factors, when assessed without considering the personal belief set, had influence over the level of public support. Some of the experiment results, such as the importance of $SuccessLevel$ in the first experiment and of $HighCost$ in the third, demonstrated the public's ability to apply rational cost-benefit analysis to foreign policy decision making. Other results, such as the importance of human costs in the first experiment and the importance of the relationship between countries in the second experiment, indicated values also had influence. The combined results demonstrated the specifics of the situation under assessment was important to the level of public support, validating their linkage in the conceptual model.

One critical finding in both the first and second experiment related to the policy preference between combat and noncombat. When overall values were not taken into account, the public showed no preference between combat and noncombat responses. The results implied the participants did not care what policy option the United States chose for dealing with the situation; other factors generated the difference in public support. Success and human costs mattered in the first experiment while the relationship and level of sympathy mattered in the second. The apathy toward combat was particularly important due to its conflict with the results of the combined models.

5.3.2 Personal Belief Sets

In each survey, the personal beliefs of the participants influenced public support[1]. The beliefs related to the ends-means relationship, the instrumental operational code belief, held the most in-

[1]The second model in each chapter "ignored" the experiment and treated the participants exclusively as survey respondents to explore the personal belief set.

fluence in every case. Philosophical operational code beliefs also had influence over the level of public support for an action, but its influence was a fraction of the former. The third experiment did not include philosophical operational code beliefs, but even in a comparison between instrumental operational code beliefs, the variable related to the effectiveness of the action was more influential than one related to costs. Across the three surveys the personal belief set had independent influence on the level of public support, a result indicating the conceptual model's relationship between beliefs and public support was valid.

5.3.3 Combined Models

The combined models showed three consistent results. First, the personal belief set variables always maintained their influence with minor changes in its power. Second, the situation factors showed dramatically different results after accounting for beliefs. These results, along with the mediation analyses, indicated the influence of the beliefs was relatively consistent and accounting for them altered the causal linkage between the situation factors and public support. This finding indicated the contingent influence arrow in the conceptual model was valid.

The third consistent result was strength of the influence of instrumental operational code beliefs. The influence of the variables related to the effectiveness of the operations was several times the influence of the philosophical operational code belief variable[2]. Further, the instrumental operational code belief variable related to effectiveness was the most influential element in each of the combined models. These results were consistent with the Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) findings.

Another result from the combined models was not as consistent, but did comport with predictions in most cases. The situation factors retaining direct influence were associated with elements the population would endow with infinite value, as Tetlock et al. (2000) discussed. In the first two experiments, the preference for noncombat operations became significant after accounting for

[2]This trend existed in the Personal Belief Set model and continued in the Full model.

beliefs despite the Situation model failing to show causal influence. This was an indication the participants normatively preferred noncombat in response to a crisis. In the first experiment, the participants preferred financial costs over human costs even after including a question about the importance of human costs in military operations as part of the factor analysis. This result indicated the human costs were normatively more valuable. In the second experiment, all three of the experiment factors retained influence, as each related to important values, friendship, sympathy, and noncombat solutions.

The third experiment posed a challenge to the idea normatively infinitely valuable situation factors would remain influential after accounting for beliefs. The preference for a humanitarian purpose for a noncombat mission was no longer significant after accounting for instrumental beliefs. Further assessment indicated the the effectiveness of the operation mattered, regardless of the humanitarian or national security purpose of it. This result was counter to the expectation saving lives would result in retained influence for a humanitarian purpose.

5.4 Implications

The power of the instrumental operational code beliefs, the variable reflecting the effectiveness of the ends-means linkage, was the strongest and most consistent result in the research. Not only was the belief variable interdependently influential, it altered the influence of situational factors. These results have important implications for political leaders desiring public support for foreign policy actions. First, because effectiveness matters to the public, leaders must set clear expectations about what the policy will accomplish. The results, therefore, support the literature on framing in international relations (Kahneman and Tversky (1984); Frisch (1993); Busby, Flynn and Druckman (2018)). Specifically, the evaluative framing of Mintz and Geva (1997) and Mintz and Redd (2003) is relevant. Evaluative framing can provide an "anchor in the assessment of the environment, and can shift the meaning of the policy debate." Leaders must provide an anchor of expectations about the effectiveness of the policy the United States will undertake. The public will

assess its perception of the effectiveness of the action against the anchor.

Realistically establishing the anchor will be important. A leader may wish to under promise effectiveness to establish a low hurdle for success, but doing so risks failing to generate sufficient support. This research found making a difference in the short and long run to be influential on public support. If the public does not find the ends-means balance valuable, support will suffer. Conversely, over promising effectiveness to garner support for an action is an option, but this research indicated doing so risks political backlash if the reality does not meet expectations. The political challenges resulting from President George W. Bush's "Mission Accomplished" speech provide an example of such blow back. One year after the speech many perceived the United States as having "had a plan, which turned out to be a pretty good plan, for winning the war, but they had no plan for winning the peace." As a result, poll numbers for the president hit their lowest level to date a year after the speech (Robberts (2004)).

The second implication relates to the opportunities more likely to garner public support. First, the the public generally supports assisting a country with whom the United States has a friendly relationship, a result consistent with broader in-group literature (Mercer (1995); Lyall (2010)). Second, the public prefers getting involved when the situation generates sympathy for the country of interest. These facts lead to policy opportunities. The United States should consider high sympathy situations as compelling action when the victim is a friend and as a strategic opportunity if the victim is not. Across those opportunities, the public prefers noncombat and military-to-military interactions, but not at the cost of successfully accomplishing the objectives of the action.

Leaders have the ability to influence the success of actions through resource decisions. For example, President Obama directed significant resources to West Africa in response to the Ebola outbreak there in 2014. However, in his September 16, 2014 speech he stated the crisis was becoming worse referring to it as "an epidemic the likes of which we have not seen before." In response,

he directed an increase in the military resources responding to the crisis including establishing a military command center in Africa to coordinate local civilian efforts there and an airlift system to rapidly deliver medical personnel and supplies to the area. As a result, Ebola cases peaked in November and rapidly declined by January of 2015[3] (Obama (2014); Center for Disease Control (2017)). The level of military participation in the Iraq War provides another example. In February of 2003, then U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, told the Senate Armed Services Committee the occupation of Iraq following the end of major combat operations would require "on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers." The Bush administration instead chose to use a much smaller force. While it is not possible to prove a larger force would have achieved success, the more limited resources failed to pacify the Iraqi population and consequently failed to achieve the administration's stated objectives.

5.5 Future Research

The results of these experiments opened up avenues for future research. One avenue to pursue relates to how elite attitudes relate to public attitudes. If the preference forming processes include similar factors, public research could serve to provide insights applicable to elite decision makers. A second avenue to research is the influence of elite political leaders and media sources as information providers as compared to peers or other source types on foreign policy preferences. The third avenue to pursue stemmed from the effectiveness of the operational code beliefs in the models. It is possible emotional processing of foreign policy decisions could be modeled similarly. Recent insights from neurobiology about how the brain processes information under emotional stress could be incorporated into the interactionist model. Costs, benefits, beliefs, values, and emotions in a single model could provide greater accuracy for understanding the complex process of forming preferences on foreign policy questions.

[3]The American response was not limited to the military, but the military provided the largest portion of personnel and resources to the effort.

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APPENDIX A

EXPERIMENT 1 SURVEY

Appendix A: Research Design and Material for Experiment 1

This experiment will follow a 2 x 2 x 2 design.

	Combat Operations		Non-Combat Operations	
	Success Low %	Success High %	Success Low %	Success High %
Human Cost	Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Scenario 5	Scenario 6
Financial Cost	Scenario 3	Scenario 4	Scenario 7	Scenario 8

Screen 1- will show the Information Sheet and this introduction:

Introduction

You are about to read a scenario about a fictional U.S. military operation. The scenario does not relate to any actual current or historical event. The scenario will provide you information to allow you to form opinions regarding the situation. You will then be asked about your opinions. Honestly conveying whatever opinion you form is the right answer.

Screen 2- will provide one of eight scenarios:

The scenarios draw on work from two separate literatures. The first is foreign aid literature. Research by Tarnoff, Paxton and Knack, Chong and Gradstein, and Milner and Tingley provide the background on trends in the public support of foreign aid. The second is conflict literature. Research into the influence of justifications for conflict and the implications of costs on public support for conflict come from Jentleson, Geva, Gartner, and Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler.

Scenario 1

Country B recently attacked its neighbor, Country A. The attack weakened the military forces of Country A allowing Country B to occupy and control the area it invaded.

Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States military deployed a large and capable combat force to the area. In cooperation with Country A, the U.S. military will conduct combat operations using any force necessary to drive Country B from the territory it occupied.

Despite the combined efforts of the United States and Country A to force Country B from the territory it took, the probability they will be able to achieve their objectives is low, estimated to be 10%. Country B is likely to remain in control of the territory it invaded for the foreseeable future.

Strong support from international organizations will result in full payment for U.S. military participation, equipment, etc. used in the crisis response. In effect, the financial cost to the United States will be no different than leaving the forces at home to train. The human cost in casualties, however, is expected to be significantly higher than leaving the American personnel at home. The vast majority of the costs to the United States will be human costs (casualties) rather than financial ones.

Scenario 2

Country B recently attacked its neighbor, Country A. The attack weakened the military forces of Country A allowing Country B to occupy and control the area it invaded.

Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States military deployed a large and capable combat force to the area. In cooperation with Country A, the U.S. military will conduct combat operations using any force necessary to drive Country B from the territory it occupied.

With the combined efforts of the United States and Country A aimed at forcing Country B from the territory it took, the probability they will be able to achieve their objectives is high, estimated to be 90%. The resulting strategic situation will restore the previous border while reducing Country B's ability to threaten its neighbor for the foreseeable future.

Strong support from international organizations will result in full payment for U.S. military participation, equipment, etc. used in the crisis response. In effect, the financial cost to the United States will be no different than leaving the forces at home to train. The human cost in casualties, however, is expected to be significantly higher than leaving the American personnel at home. The vast majority of the costs to the United States will be human costs (casualties) rather than financial ones.

Scenario 3

Country B recently attacked its neighbor, Country A. The attack weakened the military forces of Country A allowing Country B to occupy and control the area it invaded.

Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States military deployed a large and capable combat force to the area. In cooperation with Country A, the U.S. military will conduct combat operations using any force necessary to drive Country B from the territory it occupied.

Despite the combined efforts of the United States and Country A to force Country B from the territory it took, the probability they will be able to achieve their objectives is low, estimated to be 10%. Country B is likely to remain in control of the territory it invaded for the foreseeable future.

Experts assess the nature of fighting and environment will result in few casualties during any effort to retake the captured territory. Specifically, few, if any, American casualties will occur. In effect, there will be no human cost (casualties) to the United States' actions beyond those expected had the personnel remained at their home stations to train. The financial cost of the operation, however, will be significantly higher than leaving the forces at home. The vast majority of the costs to the United States will be financial costs rather than human costs (casualties).

Scenario 4

Country B recently attacked its neighbor, Country A. The attack weakened the military forces of Country A allowing Country B to occupy and control the area it invaded.

Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States military deployed a large and capable combat force to the area. In cooperation with Country A, the U.S. military will conduct combat operations using any force necessary to drive Country B from the territory it occupied.

With the combined efforts of the United States and Country A aimed at forcing Country B from the territory it took, the probability they will be able to achieve their objectives is high, estimated to be 90%. The resulting strategic situation will restore the previous border while reducing Country B's ability to threaten its neighbor for the foreseeable future.

Experts assess the nature of fighting and environment will result in few casualties during any effort to retake the captured territory. Specifically, few, if any, American casualties will occur. In effect, there will be no human cost (casualties) to the United States' actions beyond those expected had the personnel remained at their home stations to train. The financial cost of the operation, however, will be significantly higher than leaving the forces at home. The vast majority of the costs to the United States will be financial costs rather than human costs (casualties).

Scenario 5

Country B recently attacked its neighbor, Country A. The attack weakened the military forces of Country A allowing Country B to occupy and control the area it invaded.

Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States approved increased sales of military equipment at reduced cost, the transfer of excess defense equipment, and the deployment of a large number of personnel in a non-combat role to improve the training and capabilities of Country A's military.

Despite the combined efforts of the United States and Country A to force Country B from the territory it took, the probability they will be able to achieve their objectives is low, estimated to be 10%. Country B is likely to remain in control of the territory it invaded for the foreseeable future.

Strong support from international organizations will result in full payment for U.S. military participation, equipment, etc. used in the crisis response. In effect, the financial cost to the United States will be no different than leaving the forces at home to train. The human cost in casualties, however, is expected to be significantly higher than leaving the American personnel at home. The vast majority of the costs to the United States will be human costs (casualties) rather than financial ones.

Scenario 6

Country B recently attacked its neighbor, Country A. The attack weakened the military forces of Country A allowing Country B to occupy and control the area it invaded.

Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States approved increased sales of military equipment at reduced cost, the transfer of excess defense equipment, and the deployment of a large number of personnel in a non-combat role to improve the training and capabilities of Country A's military.

With the combined efforts of the United States and Country A aimed at forcing Country B from the territory it took, the probability they will be able to achieve their objectives is high, estimated to be 90%. The resulting strategic situation will restore the previous border while reducing Country B's ability to threaten its neighbor for the foreseeable future.

Strong support from international organizations will result in full payment for U.S. military participation, equipment, etc. used in the crisis response. In effect, the financial cost to the United States will be no different than leaving the forces at home to train. The human cost in casualties, however, is expected to be significantly higher than leaving the American personnel at home. The vast majority of the costs to the United States will be human costs (casualties) rather than financial ones.

Scenario 7

Country B recently attacked its neighbor, Country A. The attack weakened the military forces of Country A allowing Country B to occupy and control the area it invaded.

Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States approved increased sales of military equipment at reduced cost, the transfer of excess defense equipment, and the deployment of a large number of personnel in a non-combat role to improve the training and capabilities of Country A's military.

Despite the combined efforts of the United States and Country A to force Country B from the territory it took, the probability they will be able to achieve their objectives is low, estimated to be 10%. Country B is likely to remain in control of the territory it invaded for the foreseeable future.

Experts assess the nature of fighting and environment will result in few casualties during any effort to retake the captured territory. Specifically, few, if any, American casualties will occur. In effect, there will be no human cost (casualties) to the United States' actions beyond those expected had the personnel remained at their home stations to train. The financial cost of the operation, however, will be significantly higher than leaving the forces at home. The vast majority of the costs to the United States will be financial costs rather than human costs (casualties).

Scenario 8

Country B recently attacked its neighbor, Country A. The attack weakened the military forces of Country A allowing Country B to occupy and control the area it invaded.

Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States approved increased sales of military equipment at reduced cost, the transfer of excess defense equipment, and the deployment of a large number of personnel in a non-combat role to improve the training and capabilities of Country A's military.

With the combined efforts of the United States and Country A aimed at forcing Country B from the territory it took, the probability they will be able to achieve their objectives is high, estimated to be 90%. The resulting strategic situation will restore the previous border while reducing Country B's ability to threaten its neighbor for the foreseeable future.

Experts assess the nature of fighting and environment will result in few casualties during any effort to retake the captured territory. Specifically, few, if any, American casualties will occur. In effect, there will be no human cost (casualties) to the United States' actions beyond those expected had the personnel remained at their home stations to train. The financial cost of the operation, however, will be significantly higher than leaving the forces at home. The vast majority of the costs to the United States will be financial costs rather than human costs (casualties).

Screen 3

Overall, do you support the United States action in the scenario?
No (0) – Yes (1)

What is your level of support for the U.S. military operation described in the scenario?
Do Not Support At All– 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Fully Support

In this situation, the United States…
Should Do Less– 0 1 2 3 4 Is Doing About What it Should 6 7 8 9 10 – Should Do More

Screen 4

The actions of Country B (the attacker) are…
Morally Right – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Morally Wrong

Helping Country A (the country that was attacked in the situation) would be…
Highly Immoral – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Highly Moral

Considering the situation, how would you feel toward Country A (the country that was attacked) before any American involvement?
Happy for Them – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Bad for Them

The United States' primary response to the situation is…
Mostly Combat – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Mostly Non-Combat

Screen 5

The United States deployed forces primarily to fight the war alongside Country A…
False – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – True

The United States deployed forces primarily to train and support Country A's military…
False – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – True

Screen 6

According to the scenario, how successful should the operation be in achieving its objectives?
Totally Unsuccessful – 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% – Totally Successful

At what level of expected success would you change your opinion on supporting the American operation? (If you currently do not support it, the selected level of success would allow you to support it or if you currently support it, the selected level would cause you not to support it.)
Totally Unsuccessful – 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% – Totally Successful

Screen 7

How much of a difference do you expect this mission to make in the short run?
No Difference – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Important Difference

How much of a difference do you expect this mission to make in the long run?
No Difference – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Important Difference

Screen 8

How important are short run successes in military operations?
Not Important – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Very Important

How important are long run successes in military operations?
Not Important – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Very Important

Screen 9

The majority of costs to the United States in the scenario are…
Financial Costs – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Human Costs (Casualties)

How much benefit does the United States get from participating in this mission?
None – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – A Great Deal

Screen 10

Compared to keeping forces at home, the financial costs to the United States in the scenario are…
About the Same– 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Significantly Higher

Compared to keeping forces at home, the human costs to the United States (casualties) in the scenario are…
About the Same– 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Significantly Higher

When considering the costs of any military action, how important are financial costs?
Not At All – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Very Important Cost

When considering the costs of any military action, how important are human costs (casualties)?
Not At All – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Very Important Cost

Screen 11

If the U.S. military operation in the scenario was completely successful, how much credit would you give the political leaders who authorized it?

None – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Exclusive Credit

If the U.S. military operation in the scenario was completely successful, how much credit would you give the military leaders who conducted it?

None – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Exclusive Credit

If the U.S. military operation in the scenario was completely unsuccessful, how much blame would you give the political leaders who authorized it?

None – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Exclusive Blame

If the U.S. military operation in the scenario was completely unsuccessful, how much blame would you give the military leaders who conducted it?

None – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Exclusive Blame

Screen 12

How much would United Nations pre-approval of American actions increase your support?

None – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – A Great Deal

The United States should focus on itself and reduce its involvement with other countries.

Completely Disagree – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Completely Agree

The United States has a responsibility to shape the international environment and to engage with other countries.

Completely Disagree – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Completely Agree

Screen 13

How aware are you of United States combat operations?

Completely Uninformed – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Completely Informed

List any current U.S. combat operations about which you know. If you do not know the name of the operation provide any descriptive information you have. Descriptive information may include the location, important events, programs, or equipment important to the operation. (One operation per line.)

How aware are you of United States non-combat operations?

Completely Uninformed – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Completely Informed

List any current U.S. non-combat operations about which you know. If you do not know the name of the operation provide any descriptive information you have. Descriptive information may include the location, important events, programs, or equipment important to the operation. (One operation per line.)

Screen 14

Were you ever in the US military?

No (0) – Yes (1)

Were any of your immediate family members ever in the US military?

No (0) – Yes (1)

Screen 15

What is your sex?

Male (0) – Female (1)

How old are you?

Younger than 21, 21-25, 26-30, 31-35, 36-40, 41-45, 46-50, 51-55, 56-60, 61-65, Older than 65

What is your household income?

Less than $25,000; $25,001-37,500; $37,501-50,000; $50,001-62,500; $62,501-75,000, $75,001-87,500; $87,501-100,000; More than $100,000

Including yourself, how many people does your household income support?

1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or more

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

Did Not Complete High School – Completed High School – Some College – Completed Vocational School or Professional Apprenticeship – Completed College – Completed Advanced Graduate Degree

Screen 16

Where do you fall on the political spectrum?

Staunchly Liberal– 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Staunchly Conservative

Where would you place yourself on the party affiliation spectrum?

Democrat – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Republican

APPENDIX B

EXPERIMENT 2 SURVEY

Appendix B: Research Design and Material for Experiment 2

This experiment will follow a 2 x 2 x 2 design.

	Combat Operations		Non-Combat Operations	
	Sympathy Low	Sympathy High	Sympathy Low	Sympathy High
Friendly Relations	Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Scenario 5	Scenario 6
Challenging Relations	Scenario 3	Scenario 4	Scenario 7	Scenario 8

Screen 1- will show the Information Sheet and this introduction:

Introduction

You are about to read a scenario about a fictional U.S. military operation. The scenario does not relate to any actual current or historical event. The scenario will provide you information to allow you to form opinions regarding the situation. You will then be asked about your opinions. Honestly conveying whatever opinion you form is the right answer.

Screen 2- will provide one of eight scenarios:

The scenarios draw on work from two separate literatures. The first is foreign aid literature. Research by Tarnoff, Paxton and Knack, Chong and Gradstein, and Milner and Tingley provide the background on trends in the public support of foreign aid. The second is conflict literature. Research into the influence of justifications for conflict and the implications of costs on public support for conflict come from Jentleson, Geva, Gartner, and Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler.

Scenario 1

Country A and Country B have been long-term rivals due to a disagreement about the correct placement of their shared border. Following a series of escalating provocations including strong words from political leaders and small but tense military standoffs, Country B attacked and took control of the portion of the disputed area in Country A.

The United States has friendly relations with Country A. The populations share culture and values. The United States and Country A have common economic and political interests resulting in regular cooperation in international matters.

Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States military deployed a large and capable combat force to the area. In cooperation with Country A, the U.S. military will conduct combat operations using any force necessary to drive Country B from the territory it occupied.

Scenario 2

A natural disaster recently struck Country A resulting in large numbers of casualties and wide-spread damage to its infrastructure and governing capabilities. Country B, its neighbor, used the situation as an opportunity to invade Country A based on claims Country A stole lands from Country B. This is an absolute lie and Country B is known as an international bully and bad actor. The attack came without warning and resulted in large numbers of civilian and military casualties in Country A.

The United States has friendly relations with Country A. The populations share culture and values. The United States and Country A have common economic and political interests resulting in regular cooperation in international matters.

Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States military deployed a large and capable combat force to the area. In cooperation with Country A, the U.S. military will conduct combat operations using any force necessary to drive Country B from the territory it occupied.

Scenario 3

Country A and Country B have been long-term rivals due to a disagreement about the correct placement of their shared border. Following a series of escalating provocations including strong words from political leaders and small but tense military standoffs, Country B attacked and took control of the portion of the disputed area in Country A.

The United States and Country A have a challenging relationship. The populations see little common in their cultures and values. At the same time, Country A and the United States have few common economic and political interests and rarely cooperate on international matters.

Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States military deployed a large and capable combat force to the area. In cooperation with Country A, the U.S. military will conduct combat operations using any force necessary to drive Country B from the territory it occupied.

Scenario 4

A natural disaster recently struck Country A resulting in large numbers of casualties and wide-spread damage to its infrastructure and governing capabilities. Country B, its neighbor, used the situation as an opportunity to invade Country A based on claims Country A stole lands from Country B. This is an absolute lie and Country B is known as an international bully and bad actor. The attack came without warning and resulted in large numbers of civilian and military casualties in Country A.

The United States and Country A have a challenging relationship. The populations see little common in their cultures and values. At the same time, Country A and the United States have few common economic and political interests and rarely cooperate on international matters.

Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States military deployed a large and capable combat force to the area. In cooperation with Country A, the U.S. military will conduct combat operations using any force necessary to drive Country B from the territory it occupied.

Scenario 5

Country A and Country B have been long-term rivals due to a disagreement about the correct placement of their shared border. Following a series of escalating provocations including strong words from political leaders and small but tense military standoffs, Country B attacked and took control of the portion of the disputed area in Country A.

The United States has friendly relations with Country A. The populations share culture and values. The United States and Country A have common economic and political interests resulting in regular cooperation in international matters.

Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States approved increased sales of military equipment at reduced cost, the transfer of excess defense equipment, and the deployment of a large number of personnel in a non-combat role to improve the training and capabilities of Country A's military.

Scenario 6

A natural disaster recently struck Country A resulting in large numbers of casualties and wide-spread damage to its infrastructure and governing capabilities. Country B, its neighbor, used the situation as an opportunity to invade Country A based on claims Country A stole lands from Country B. This is an absolute lie and Country B is known as an international bully and bad actor. The attack came without warning and resulted in large numbers of civilian and military casualties in Country A.

The United States has friendly relations with Country A. The populations share culture and values. The United States and Country A have common economic and political interests resulting in regular cooperation in international matters.

Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States approved increased sales of military equipment at reduced cost, the transfer of excess defense equipment, and the deployment of a large number of personnel in a non-combat role to improve the training and capabilities of Country A's military.

Scenario 7

Country A and Country B have been long-term rivals due to a disagreement about the correct placement of their shared border. Following a series of escalating provocations including strong words from political leaders and small but tense military standoffs, Country B attacked and took control of the portion of the disputed area in Country A.

The United States and Country A have a challenging relationship. The populations see little common in their cultures and values. At the same time, Country A and the United States have few common economic and political interests and rarely cooperate on international matters.

Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States approved increased sales of military equipment at reduced cost, the transfer of excess defense equipment, and the deployment of a large number of personnel in a non-combat role to improve the training and capabilities of Country A's military.

Scenario 8

A natural disaster recently struck Country A resulting in large numbers of casualties and wide-spread damage to its infrastructure and governing capabilities. Country B, its neighbor, used the situation as an opportunity to invade Country A based on claims Country A stole lands from Country B. This is an absolute lie and Country B is known as an international bully and bad actor. The attack came without warning and resulted in large numbers of civilian and military casualties in Country A.

The United States and Country A have a challenging relationship. The populations see little common in their cultures and values. At the same time, Country A and the United States have few common economic and political interests and rarely cooperate on international matters.

Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States approved increased sales of military equipment at reduced cost, the transfer of excess defense equipment, and the deployment of a large number of personnel in a non-combat role to improve the training and capabilities of Country A's military.

Screen 3

Overall, do you support the United States action in the scenario?
No (0) – Yes (1)

What is your level of support for the U.S. military operation described in the scenario?
Do Not Support At All– 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Fully Support

In this situation, the United States…
Should Do Less– 0 1 2 3 4 Is Doing About What it Should 6 7 8 9 10 – Should Do More

Screen 4

The actions of Country B (the attacker) are…
Morally Right – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Morally Wrong

Helping Country A (the country that was attacked in the situation) would be…
Highly Immoral – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Highly Moral

Considering the situation, how would you feel toward Country A (the country that was attacked) before any American involvement?
Happy for Them – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Bad for Them

The United States' primary response to the situation is…
Mostly Combat – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Mostly Non-Combat

Screen 5

The United States deployed forces primarily to fight the war alongside Country A…
False – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – True

The United States deployed forces primarily to train and support Country A's military…
False – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – True

The United States actions in the situation are…
Totally Unjustified – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Completely Justified

Screen 6

The United States' relationship with Country A (the country that was attacked in the situation) is best described as…
Challenging – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Friendly

The United States' and Country A (the country that was attacked in the situation) have common interests and values…

False – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – True

What type of relationship with Country A would cause you to change your opinion on supporting the American operation? (If you currently do not support it, the selected level of relationship would allow you to support it or if you currently support it, the selected level would cause you not to support it.)

Bitter Enemy – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Close Friend and Ally

Screen 7

What do you think the chances are the operation will successfully return the situation to the conditions before the attack?

No Chance – 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% – Certain

At what level of expected success would you change your opinion on supporting the American operation? (If you currently do not support it, the selected level of success would allow you to support it or if you currently support it, the selected level would cause you not to support it.)

Totally Unsuccessful – 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% – Totally Successful

How much benefit does the United States get from participating in this mission?

None – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – A Great Deal

Screen 8

How much of a difference do you expect this mission to make in the short run?

No Difference – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Important Difference

How much of a difference do you expect this mission to make in the long run?

No Difference – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Important Difference

Screen 9

How important are short run successes in military operations?

Not Important – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Very Important

How important are long run successes in military operations?

Not Important – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Very Important

Screen 10

When considering the costs of any military action, how important are financial costs?

Not At All – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Very Important

When considering the costs of any military action, how important are human costs (casualties)?

Not At All – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Very Important

Screen 11

If the U.S. military operation in the scenario was completely successful, how much credit would you give the political leaders who authorized it?

None – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Exclusive Credit

If the U.S. military operation in the scenario was completely successful, how much credit would you give the military leaders who conducted it?

None – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Exclusive Credit

If the U.S. military operation in the scenario was completely unsuccessful, how much blame would you give the political leaders who authorized it?

None – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Exclusive Blame

If the U.S. military operation in the scenario was completely unsuccessful, how much blame would you give the military leaders who conducted it?

None – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Exclusive Blame

Screen 12

How much would United Nations pre-approval of American actions increase your support?

None – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – A Great Deal

The United States should focus on itself and reduce its involvement with other countries.

Completely Disagree – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Completely Agree

The United States has a responsibility to shape the international environment and to engage with other countries.

Completely Disagree – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Completely Agree

Screen 13

How aware are you of United States combat operations?

Completely Uninformed – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Completely Informed

List any current U.S. combat operations about which you know. If you do not know the name of the operation provide any descriptive information you have. Descriptive information may include the location, important events, programs, or equipment important to the operation. (One operation per line.)

How aware are you of United States non-combat operations?

Completely Uninformed – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Completely Informed

List any current U.S. non-combat operations about which you know. If you do not know the name of the operation provide any descriptive information you have. Descriptive information may include the location, important events, programs, or equipment important to the operation. (One operation per line.)

Screen 14

Were you ever in the US military?

No (0) – Yes (1)

Were any of your immediate family members ever in the US military?

No (0) – Yes (1)

Screen 15

What is your sex?

Male (0) – Female (1)

How old are you?

Younger than 21, 21-25, 26-30, 31-35, 36-40, 41-45, 46-50, 51-55, 56-60, 61-65, Older than 65

What is your household income?

Less than $25,000; $25,001-37,500; $37,501-50,000; $50,001-62,500; $62,501-75,000, $75,001-87,500; $87,501-100,000; More than $100,000

Including yourself, how many people does your household income support?

1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or more

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

Did Not Complete High School – Completed High School – Some College – Completed Vocational School or Professional Apprenticeship – Completed College – Completed Advanced Graduate Degree

Screen 16

Where do you fall on the political spectrum?

Staunchly Liberal– 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Staunchly Conservative

Where would you place yourself on the party affiliation spectrum?

Democrat – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Republican

APPENDIX C

EXPERIMENT 3 SURVEY

Appendix C: Research Design and Material for Experiment 3

This experiment will follow a 2 x 2 x 2 design.

	National Security		Humanitarian	
	High Cost	Low Cost	High Cost	Low Cost
Civil Development	Scenario 3	Scenario 4	Scenario 5	Scenario 8
Military Development	Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Scenario 6	Scenario 7

Screen 1- will show the Information Sheet and this introduction:

Introduction

You are about to read a scenario about a fictional non-combat deployment of US military personnel. The scenario does not relate to any actual current or historical event. The scenario will provide you information to allow you to form opinions regarding the situation. You will then be asked about your opinions. Honestly conveying whatever opinion you form is the right answer.

Screen 2- will provide one of eight scenarios:

The scenarios draw on work by Jentleson, and separate work by Geva.

Scenario 1

The United States has a long-term interest in the success of a foreign government. The target country's location is of strategic importance. The position allows it to ensure trade routes critical to the US economy remain open. Loss of control of the trade routes could result in a dire economic decline in the US economy. The target country is also the only source of a mineral used for US national defense. Loss of cooperation between the countries could leave the United States without access to the strategic resource.

The target country is under threat from an insurgency with ties to attacks on western interests. The intent of the insurgency is to overthrow and replace the current government. If the insurgency takes control, experts do not expect a humanitarian crisis, but they do believe the target country will become a base for exporting violence against the United States and other western countries.

The host nation military suffers from high turnover, low motivation, and low competence. As a result, individual skills decline rapidly and the host nation's forces must continually train new personnel replacing departing military members. Without improvements in the military capabilities of the target country, it is likely the insurgency will be successful in its overthrow attempts.

The political leadership of the target country requested, and US leaders intend to send, a large US military force into the country to conduct a non-combat mission to improve the military capabilities of the target country. The missions include exchanges of ideas and training concepts at all levels from junior military members to senior leaders. The US force will not engage in any combat operations during the deployment. Leaders of both the target country and the United States want this deployment to improve capabilities and relations.

The process of deploying the force into a foreign country and executing the mission there imparts significant costs on the American people. US military leaders expect the training in the target country to be many times more expensive than training at a home station. As well, training the military of the target country reduces the opportunity for the US forces to improve their own capabilities.

Finally, having US forces train the target country's military significantly increases risks for the US force. US military and political leaders expect deaths and injuries to occur during the operation. Leaders expect the numbers of dead and injured to be much higher than would exist if the US military remained at its home station.

Scenario 2

The United States has a long-term interest in the success of a foreign government. The target country's location is of strategic importance. The position allows it to ensure trade routes critical to the US economy remain open. Loss of control of the trade routes could result in a dire economic decline in the US economy. The target country is also the only source of a mineral used for US national defense. Loss of cooperation between the countries could leave the United States without access to the strategic resource.

The target country is under threat from an insurgency with ties to attacks on western interests. The intent of the insurgency is to overthrow and replace the current government. If the insurgency takes control, experts do not expect a humanitarian crisis, but they do believe the target country will become a base for exporting violence against the United States and other western countries.

The host nation military suffers from high turnover, low motivation, and low competence. As a result, individual skills decline rapidly and the host nation's forces must continually train new personnel replacing departing military members. Without improvements in the military capabilities of the target country, it is likely the insurgency will be successful in its overthrow attempts.

The political leadership of the target country requested, and US leaders intend to send, a large US military force into the country to conduct a non-combat mission to improve the military capabilities of the target country. The missions include exchanges of ideas and training concepts at all levels from junior military members to senior leaders. The US force will not engage in any combat operations during the deployment. Leaders of both the target country and the United States want this deployment to improve capabilities and relations.

The financial cost of the deployment is nearly identical to the cost of training the US force without deploying them because the target country will provide support, within its capabilities, to the US military operation. US military and political leaders are happy with the target country's level of support.

The US military does not expect deaths or injuries beyond the accidental levels expected during peacetime operations at a home station because the forces are deploying into a cooperative environment.

Scenario 3

The United States has a long-term interest in the success of a foreign government. The target country's location is of strategic importance. The position allows it to ensure trade routes critical to the US economy remain open. Loss of control of the trade routes could result in a dire economic decline in the US economy. The target country is also the only source of a mineral used for US national defense. Loss of cooperation between the countries could leave the United States without access to the strategic resource.

The target country is under threat from an insurgency with ties to attacks on western interests. The intent of the insurgency is to overthrow and replace the current government. If the insurgency takes control, experts do not expect a humanitarian crisis, but they do believe the target country will become a base for exporting violence against the United States and other western countries.

The target country needs to improve its civilian infrastructure and governance capabilities to alleviate the grievances motivating the insurgency. The political leadership of the target country requested, and US leaders intend to send a large US military force into the country to conduct a wide-ranging effort to improve the capabilities of the target nation's hospitals, transportation networks, and law enforcement practices. The US military has the ability to assist the target country in each of these areas. Leaders of both the target country and the United States want this deployment to improve capabilities and relations.

The US force will not be working with the target nation's military, nor will it engage in any combat operations during the deployment.

The process of deploying the force into a foreign country and executing the mission there imparts significant costs on the American people. US military leaders expect the training in the target country to be many times more expensive than training at a home station. As well, training the military of the target country reduces the opportunity for the US forces to improve their own capabilities.

Finally, having US forces working in the target country significantly increases risks for the US force. US military and political leaders expect deaths and injuries to occur during the operation. Leaders expect the numbers of dead and injured to be much higher than would exist if the US military remained at its home station.

Scenario 4

The United States has a long-term interest in the success of a foreign government. The target country's location is of strategic importance. The position allows it to ensure trade routes critical to the US economy remain open. Loss of control of the trade routes could result in a dire economic decline in the US economy. The target country is also the only source of a mineral used for US national defense. Loss of cooperation between the countries could leave the United States without access to the strategic resource.

The target country is under threat from an insurgency with ties to attacks on western interests. The intent of the insurgency is to overthrow and replace the current government. If the insurgency takes control, experts do not expect a humanitarian crisis, but they do believe the target country will become a base for exporting violence against the United States and other western countries.

The target country needs to improve its civilian infrastructure and governance capabilities to alleviate the grievances motivating the insurgency. The political leadership of the target country requested, and US leaders intend to send a large US military force into the country to conduct a wide-ranging effort to improve the capabilities of the target nation's hospitals, transportation networks, and law enforcement practices. The US military has the ability to assist the target country in each of these areas. Leaders of both the target country and the United States want this deployment to improve capabilities and relations.

The US force will not be working with the target nation's military, nor will it engage in any combat operations during the deployment.

The financial cost of the deployment is nearly identical to the cost of training the US force without deploying them because the target country will provide support, within its capabilities, to the US military operation. US military and political leaders are happy with the target country's level of support.

The US military does not expect deaths or injuries beyond the accidental levels expected during peacetime operations at a home station because the forces are deploying into a cooperative environment.

Scenario 5

A severe natural disaster struck a foreign country, killing more than 10,000 people in less than twenty-four hours. Without massive international assistance, experts estimate 50,000 more people will die in the next week and more than 100,000 people will die before the situation stabilizes.

The target country needs to rebuild its civilian infrastructure and governance capabilities. The political leadership of the target country requested, and US leaders intend to send, a large US military force into the country to conduct a wide-ranging effort to improve the capabilities of the target nation's hospitals, transportation networks, and law enforcement practices. The US military has the ability to assist the target country in each of these areas. Leaders of both the target country and the United States want this deployment to improve capabilities and relations.

The US force will not be working with the target nation's military, nor will it engage in any combat operations during the deployment.

The process of deploying the force into a foreign country and executing the mission there imparts significant costs on the American people. US military leaders expect the training in the target country to be many times more expensive than training at a home station. As well, training the military of the target country reduces the opportunity for the US forces to improve their own capabilities.

Finally, having US forces working in the target country significantly increases risks for the US force. US military and political leaders expect deaths and injuries to occur during the operation. Leaders expect the numbers of dead and injured to be much higher than would exist if the US military remained at its home station.

Scenario 6

A severe natural disaster struck a foreign country, killing more than 10,000 people in less than twenty-four hours. Without massive international assistance, experts estimate 50,000 more people will die in the next week and more than 100,000 people will die before the situation stabilizes.

The target country's military is the only local organization with any capacity to provide a response and coordinate the relief effort. To be effective, the target country's military requires additional training. Without training, the response will be inefficient and will save fewer lives than it could.

The political leadership of the target country requested, and US leaders intend to send, a large US military force into the country to conduct a non-combat mission to improve the military capabilities of the target country. The missions include exchanges of ideas and training concepts at all levels from junior military members to senior leaders. The US force will not engage in any combat operations during the deployment. Leaders of both the target country and the United States want this deployment to improve capabilities and relations.

The process of deploying the force into a foreign country and executing the mission there imparts significant costs on the American people. US military leaders expect the training in the target country to be many times more expensive than training at a home station. As well, training the military of the target country reduces the opportunity for the US forces to improve their own capabilities.

Finally, having US forces train the target country's military significantly increases risks for the US force. US military and political leaders expect deaths and injuries to occur during the operation. Leaders expect the numbers of dead and injured to be much higher than would exist if the US military remained at its home station.

Scenario 7

A severe natural disaster struck a foreign country, killing more than 10,000 people in less than twenty-four hours. Without massive international assistance, experts estimate 50,000 more people will die in the next week and more than 100,000 people will die before the situation stabilizes.

The target country's military is the only local organization with any capacity to provide a response and coordinate the relief effort. To be effective, the target country's military requires additional training. Without training, the response will be inefficient and will save fewer lives than it could.

The political leadership of the target country requested, and US leaders intend to send, a large US military force into the country to conduct a non-combat mission to improve the military capabilities of the target country. The missions include exchanges of ideas and training concepts at all levels from junior military members to senior leaders. The US force will not engage in any combat operations during the deployment. Leaders of both the target country and the United States want this deployment to improve capabilities and relations.

The financial cost of the deployment is nearly identical to the cost of training the US force without deploying them because the target country will provide support, within its capabilities, to the US military operation. US military and political leaders are happy with the target country's level of support.

The US military does not expect deaths or injuries beyond the accidental levels expected during peacetime operations at a home station because the forces are deploying into a cooperative environment.

Scenario 8

A severe natural disaster struck a foreign country, killing more than 10,000 people in less than twenty-four hours. Without massive international assistance, experts estimate 50,000 more people will die in the next week and more than 100,000 people will die before the situation stabilizes.

The target country needs to rebuild its civilian infrastructure and governance capabilities. The political leadership of the target country requested, and US leaders intend to send, a large US military force into the country to conduct a wide-ranging effort to improve the capabilities of the target nation's hospitals, transportation networks, and law enforcement practices. The US military has the ability to assist the target country in each of these areas. Leaders of both the target country and the United States want this deployment to improve capabilities and relations.

The US force will not be working with the target nation's military, nor will it engage in any combat operations during the deployment.

The financial cost of the deployment is nearly identical to the cost of training the US force without deploying them because the target country will provide support, within its capabilities, to the US military operation. US military and political leaders are happy with the target country's level of support.

The US military does not expect deaths or injuries beyond the accidental levels expected during peacetime operations at a home station because the forces are deploying into a cooperative environment.

Each participant will receive the same set of questions:

Screen 3

What is your level of support for the US military operation described in the scenario?

Do Not Support – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Fully Support

Screen 4

The overall motivation, if you could only pick one, for US involvement in the scenario is to improve US national security?

Completely Disagree – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Completely Agree

The overall motivation, if you could only pick one, for US involvement in the scenario is humanitarian assistance?

Completely Disagree – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Completely Agree

How much do you think the primary task of the US military in this mission is to improve the civilian capabilities of the target country?

Not The Task – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Exactly The Task

How much do you think the primary task of the US military in this mission is to improve the military capabilities of the target country?

Not The Task – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Exactly The Task

Screen 5

Compared to keeping US forces at home, how costly do you consider this mission to be?

Closer To Home Costs – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Higher Than Home Costs

When thinking of the costs of the mission, how important to you is the financial element of cost?

Not Important – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Highly Important

When thinking of the costs of the mission, how important to you is risk of injury or death in the way you determine cost?

Not Important – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Highly Important

Screen 6

How likely to be successful do you think this mission will be?

Unsuccessful – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Highly Successful

How much did your expectation about the success of the mission influence your support?

Not At All – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – A Great Deal

How much of a difference will this mission make in the short run?

No Difference – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Important Difference

How much of a difference will this mission make in the long run?

No Difference – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Important Difference

Screen 7

These questions refer to your general opinion regarding the role of US military forces.

The US military can achieve success conducting missions across a broad spectrum spanning from civilian capability development to warfighting.

Completely Disagree – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Completely Agree

The United States should use its military in non-combat environments to pursue national interests.

Completely Disagree – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Completely Agree

Screen 8

Were you ever in the US military?

No (0) – Yes (1)

Were any of your immediate family members ever in the US military?

No (0) – Yes (1)

Screen 9

What is your sex?

Male (0) – Female (1)

How old are you?

Younger than 21, 21-25, 26-30, 31-35, 36-40, 41-45, 46-50, 51-55, 56-60, 61-65, Older than 65

What is your household income?

Less than $25,000; $25,001-37,500; $37,501-50,000; $50,001-62,500; $62,501-75,000, $75,001-87,500; $87,501-100,000; More than $100,000

Including yourself, how many people does your household income support?

1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or more

Screen 10

How politically liberal are you?

Not Liberal – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Staunchly Liberal

How politically conservative are you?

Not Conservative – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Staunchly Conservative

Where would you place yourself on the party affiliation spectrum?

Democrat – 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Republican

Screens 11

Were you eligible to vote in the last election related to an office of the federal government?

No (0) – Yes (1)

If you were eligible, did you vote in the last election related to an office of the federal government? (If not, just click next)

No (0) – Yes (1)

Do you expect to be eligible to vote in the next election related to an office of the federal government?

No (0) – Yes (1)

If you will be eligible, do you expect to vote in the next election related to an office of the federal government? (If not, just click next)

No (0) – Yes (1)